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“[T]here is always a well-known solution to every human problem—
neat, plausible, and wrong.”1

I. INTRODUCTION
The Florida Supreme Court breathed new life into H. L. Mencken’s
axiom with its decision in Whiley v. Scott.2 Upon taking office in 2011,
Governor Rick Scott ordered agencies under his direction to suspend
administrative rulemaking pending further review by his office.3 A food
stamp recipient bypassed the trial and intermediate Florida appellate courts
by filing an original action in the Florida Supreme Court, in the form of a
petition for writ of quo warranto, arguing the governor had no authority to
order such a suspension.4 A majority of the court opined that the governor
lacked authority to direct his at-will appointees to suspend administrative
rulemaking.5 Over the vigorous dissents of the Chief Justice and another
member of the court, the majority concluded: (1) the legislature could place
administrative agencies under the complete control of at-will gubernatorial
appointees, and (2) neither the supreme executive power constitutionally
vested in the governor, nor the authority to remove at-will appointees,
authorized the governor to direct these agency heads without further
statutory authority.6
The majority found the exercise of administrative rulemaking authority
by subordinate agency heads—appointed by and serving at the pleasure of
the governor—was not subject to the governor’s direction or supervision

* Eric H. Miller, B.A. (Florida State University 1978), M.A. (Florida State University 2012),
J.D. (Florida State University 1984). Admitted to The Florida Bar (1984) and to the U.S.
District Courts for the Northern (1991), Middle (1985), and Southern (1991) Districts of
Florida. Board Certified by The Florida Bar in State & Federal Government and
Administrative Practice (2008). Mr. Miller has practiced privately and in government
agencies in administrative, bankruptcy, civil, commercial, and constitutional law. Since 2010,
he has served on the staff of the Florida House of Representatives.
1
H.L. Mencken, Prejudices: Second Series, 158 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf 1920).
2
79 So. 3d 702 (Fla. 2011).
3
Fla. Exec. Order No. 2011-01 (Jan. 4, 2011).
4
Petition for Writ of Quo Warranto, Whiley v. Scott, 79 So. 3d 702 (Fla. 2011) (No.
SC11-592).
5
Whiley v. Scott, 79 So. 3d 702, at 705 (Fla. 2011).
6
Id. at 715.
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because the legislature had not empowered such oversight.7 Narrowly
viewing the agency’s rulemaking as controlled exclusively by the legislature,
the majority ignored the full extent of constitutionally vested executive
power, failed to follow the court’s own principles of constitutional
interpretation, and relied instead on the questionable reasoning in a dormant
attorney general’s opinion.8 The decision effectively recognized a “fourth
branch of government”—agency heads appointed by and serving at the
pleasure of the governor, but immune from gubernatorial direction and
supervision.9 Finding “the power to remove is not analogous to the power
to control,” the court invited the legislature to clarify the law.10
Accepting the invitation, the legislature passed Chapter 2012-116,
Laws of Florida.11 The law confirmed: (a) all but one of the governor’s
actions conformed with existing law; (b) all appointed agency heads
remained subordinate to the direction and supervision of the governor (or
other appointing authority, such as the cabinet); and (c) as a procedural
statute, the Florida Administrative Procedure Act12 operates within the
structure of constitutional executive power.13 Twenty-six legislative
findings grounded the law on Florida’s historical understanding and
application of the constitutional executive power since Florida’s founding.14
Quoting The Federalist, tracing the development of the executive article in
each succeeding version of the Florida Constitution, and citing the historical
record on the framing of the present document, the legislature approved the
Whiley dissenters’ analysis as properly articulating both the Constitution and
the legislative intent for the statutory structure of the executive branch.15
Proper analysis of the majority’s opinion and the subsequent legislative
response16 requires an understanding of the constitutional context of
executive power in Florida and the implementation of executive authority
under the 1968 Florida Constitution. This article examines the issues and
arguments before the court, the majority and dissenting opinions, and the
principles of constitutional interpretation from which the majority strayed
based largely on an isolated attorney general opinion. The article discusses
the decision’s consequences, questioning both the efficacy of proceeding in
7

Id. at 716–717.
FLA. OFF. OF THE ATT’Y GEN., AGO 81-49, EXECUTIVE
(1981) (hereinafter “AGO 81-49”).
9
See Whiley, 79 So. 3d at 713–714.
10
Id. at 715, 717.
11
See 2012 Fla. Laws 116.
12
FLA. STAT. § 120 (2012).
13
2012 Fla. Laws 116, §§ 1, 2.
14
2012 Fla. Laws 116, § 1.
15
2012 Fla. Laws 116, § 1(26)(b).
16
See, e.g., 2012 Fla. Laws 116.
8
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quo warranto and whether the opinion has any precedential effect because
the writ itself was withheld. Finally, the article analyzes how the subsequent
legislation reaffirmed the Florida executive branch’s historical,
constitutionally vested executive power. By contrasting the restricted
construction adopted by the majority with a proper interpretation of the
Florida Constitution, the article shows the majority’s opinion is neat and
plausible, but wrong.
A. Historical Context of Constitutional Executive Power in Florida
Analyzing the court’s competing rationales first requires understanding
the historical context and development of the Florida Constitution, as well
as the implementation of executive authority by the Florida Legislature and
succeeding governors.17
Florida’s first Constitution was based on fifty years’ experience of both
national and state executive power.18 In 1789, the United States Congress
concluded that the constitutional grant of executive power to the President
implied the inherent authority to direct, control, and remove those officers
appointed to serve at the President’s pleasure.19 The vesting and limiting of
executive power in contemporary and subsequent state constitutions
followed a similar pattern: the plenary executive authority was placed in the
executive branch, subject to express limitations, and the chief magistrate
(usually denominated “governor”) was responsible for exercising the full
executive power, except as otherwise clearly provided.20 Because state
constitutions often limited executive power by allocating specific functions
to other officers, the authority vested in the governor was called the
“supreme executive power.”21
This distinguished the governor’s
responsibilities from specific, separately-allocated powers to ensure the
complete exercise of the full executive power.22 Similar to its use in
constitutional articles vesting judicial power by creating more than one court,
the word “supreme” connoted a hierarchy of responsibility within the
executive branch.23
Every version of the Florida Constitution used the same phrasing in the
17

See Eric H. Miller, The Historical Development of Executive Branch Oversight and
Control in Florida: 1838–1968, 13 AVE MARIA L. REV. 371 (2015) (hereinafter “Historical
Development”); Eric H. Miller, The Direction and Supervision by Elected Officials of Florida
Executive Branch Agencies and Administrative Rulemaking: 1968–2012, 12 AVE MARIA L.
REV. 333 (2014) (hereinafter “Direction and Supervision”).
18
Miller, Historical Development, supra note 17, at 394.
19
Id. at 387–88.
20
Id. at 390–94.
21
Id.
22
Id. at 390, 394.
23
Id. at 397.
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executive article to describe the power and authority of the governor.24
Numerous amendments to the various executive articles neither constrained
the executive authority over at-will gubernatorial appointees nor impliedly
authorized such officers to act independently from the governor’s control.25
The framers revised the executive article in the 1968 Constitution,
particularly those provisions concerning executive branch reorganization,
only after expressly rejecting legislative control over the direction and
supervision of subordinate appointees by constitutional officers.26
The 1968 constitutional revisions impacted the structure of Florida’s
modern executive branch. Substantively, the legislature restructured the
executive agencies by placing most under the authority of an appointee
serving at the pleasure of the governor.27 Procedurally, the legislature
created the Florida Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”)28 to provide the
uniform processes all administrative agencies must follow when performing
their statutory duties.29
Numerous governors showed a common
interpretation of their constitutional authority, particularly over the
implementation of general policy through agency rulemaking, by directing
and supervising the form, content, and goals of rules adopted by
administrative agencies.30 While monitoring and periodically revising the
requirements for rulemaking, the legislature never raised a concern about the
direction and control of appointed agency heads by the various governors.31
This legislative inaction made an anomalous 1981 attorney general
opinion all the more curious.32 Ignoring the historical context of executive
power in Florida, and failing to read properly the pertinent sections of the
executive article,33 the attorney general opinion concluded that the governor
could not direct and supervise agency rulemaking because the legislature
only authorized the exercise of rulemaking power by the at-will, subordinate
appointees, rather than the governor.34 The subsequent conduct of both the
legislature and the various governors showed a settled understanding of the
Constitution directly opposite to this conclusion, and the opinion remained
24

Miller, Historical Development, supra note 17, at 377–78.
Id. at 397–405.
26
Id. at 412–14.
27
See 1969 Fla. Laws 106.
28
FLA. STAT. § 120 (2012).
29
FLA. STAT. § 120.515 (2012).
30
Miller, Direction and Supervision, supra note 17, at 349–52.
31
See, e.g., 1996 Fla. Laws 159; 1999 Fla. Laws 379; 2010 Fla. Laws 279; 2011 Fla.
Laws 225; 2016 Fla. Laws 116.
32
FLA. OFF. OF THE ATT’Y GEN., AGO 81-49, EXECUTIVE ORDER AS BINDING ORDER
(1981) (hereinafter “AGO 81-49”); see Miller, Direction and Supervision, supra note 17, at
354–57.
33
FLA. CONST. art. IV, §§ 1(a), 6 (1968).
34
AGO 81-49.
25
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dormant for thirty years.35
It would return.
II. PROLOGUE TO QUO WARRANTO
Rosalie Whiley filed a petition for writ of quo warranto in the Florida
Supreme Court, requesting a ruling that newly-elected Governor Rick Scott
had no power to suspend, direct, supervise, or otherwise interfere with
agency rulemaking.36 This issue was already part of pending, activelycontested litigation predating the new governor’s election in November
2010.37 The following discussion shows the development of the issues in the
Etienne case and their relevance to the Whiley petition.
A. Etienne v. DCF
Eva Etienne sought continued benefits under the Supplemental
Nutrition Assistance Program (“SNAP”)38 by applying for renewal online.39
The existing online form40 did not permit an application using minimum
personal information. Etienne challenged the applicable administrative rule
as an invalid exercise of the Department of Children and Family Services’
(DCF) delegated rulemaking authority.41 DCF requested a continuance of
the final hearing to initiate rulemaking revising the online form. Although
Etienne’s counsel objected to any delay, arguing the challenge process better

35
Amicus Brief of the Attorney General in Support of Respondent at 16–17, Whiley v.
Scott, 79 So. 3d 702 (Fla. 2011) (No. SC11-592).
36
Petition for Writ of Quo Warranto, supra note 4.
37
See Etienne v. Dep’t of Children and Family Servs., Case nos. 10-005141RP, 10009516RP, 10-010105RP (Florida Division of Administrative Hearings 2010),
http://www.doah.state.fl.us/ALJ/searchDOAH (last visited Nov. 9, 2018). The information
about the Etienne litigation is drawn from the three cases filed with the Florida Division of
Administrative Hearings (“DOAH”), each styled Etienne v. Dep’t of Children and Family
Servs., later consolidated into one proceeding under Case No. 10-005141RP.
38
See, e.g. 7 U.S.C. § 2213 (2010). SNAP is funded through the U.S. Dept. of
Agriculture and controlled primarily by USDA regulations. In Florida, SNAP is administered
through the Florida Dept. of Children and Family Services.
39
See Petition to Determine Invalidity of Access Rule 65A-1.400(1)(d), Etienne v. Dep’t
of Children and Family Servs., No. 10-005141RP (Florida Division of Administrative
Hearings 2010), http://www.doah.state.fl.us/ALJ/searchDOAH (last visited Nov. 29, 2018).
40
ACCESS Online Application System, CF-ES Form 2353, Mar 08 (promulgated under
authority of Florida Administrative Procedure Rule 65A-1.400(1)(d)).
41
Petition to Determine Invalidity of Access Rule 65A-1.4000(1)(d), Etienne v. Dep’t
of Children and Family Servs., No. 10-005141RP (July 9, 2010). Florida law provides several
opportunities for those substantially affected by agency rule to challenge whether the agency
exceeded the authority delegated by the legislature. Proposed rules may be challenged under
FLA. STAT. § 120.56(2)-(3) (2018). “Invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority” is
expressly defined by FLA. STAT. § 120.52(8) (2018), with particular reference to agency
rulemaking.

MILLER (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

1/16/2019 11:09 AM

WHILEY V. SCOTT

7

protected Etienne’s rights,42 the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”)
continued the hearing.43 On September 10, 2010, DCF reported rulemaking
progress, having published the notice of proposed Rule 65A-1.205(1), and
requested a further continuance.44 Etienne objected because the parties
fundamentally disagreed about the interpretation of key terms in the
applicable federal regulations,45 but the ALJ continued the final hearing.46
Etienne separately challenged DCF’s ACCESS CF-ES Form 2353, and
that matter was consolidated with the original case.47 After the parties filed
competing motions for a summary final order,48 Etienne filed a third petition
challenging the published revisions to proposed Rule 65A-1.205(1), which
was consolidated with the existing proceeding.49 The ALJ scheduled the
final evidentiary hearing for March 2011,50 before hearing oral argument on
the motions for summary final order on December 22, 2010. The
consolidated cases were still pending when Governor Scott took office on
January 4, 2011.51
B. Executive Order 11-01
Within an hour of taking office, Governor Scott issued “Executive
Order Number 11-01 (Suspending Rulemaking and Establishing the Office
42

See FLA. STAT. §§ 120.56(1)(c), (1)(d) (2018). Administrative challenges to rules have
strict statutory deadlines. In 2010, a petition complying with the statute was required to be
assigned to an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) within 10 days of being filed with DOAH;
the final evidentiary hearing was then required to be held within 30 days unless the ALJ
granted a continuance agreed by the parties or for good cause shown. FLA. STAT. §
120.56(1)(c) (2010). The ALJ’s final order was required to be rendered within 30 days from
the hearing. FLA. STAT. § 120.56(1)(d) (2010). The present statutes require the same.
43
Order Granting Continuance and Canceling Hearing, Etienne v. Dep’t of Children and
Family Servs., No. 10-005141RP (Aug. 2, 2010).
44
Respondent’s First Status Report, Etienne v. Dep’t of Children and Family Servs., No.
10-005141RP (Sept. 10, 2010).
45
Response of Petitioner, Etienne v. Dep’t of Children and Family Servs. No. 10005141RP (Sept. 16, 2010).
46
Order Continuing Abeyance, Etienne v. Dep’t of Children and Family Servs. No. 10005141RP (Sept. 24, 2010).
47
Petition to Determine Invalidity of Proposed rule 65A-1.400(1)(d), supra note 41. See
also Order of Consolidation, Etienne v. Dep’t of Children and Family Servs., Nos. 105141RX & 10-9516RP (Oct. 14, 2010). ACCESS CF-ES Form 2353, dated September 2010,
was published in Rule 65A-1.400 and incorporated by reference in proposed Rule 65A1.205(1).
48
FLA. STAT. § 120.57(1)(h) (2011). Analogous to a motion for summary final judgment
in federal or state court.
49
Order Granting Motion for Consolidation and Continuance, Etienne v. Dep’t of
Children and Family Servs., Nos. 10-5141RX, 10-9516RP, 10-10105RP (Dec. 9, 2010).
50
Order Re-Scheduling Hearing, Etienne v. Dep’t of Children and Family Servs., Nos.
10-5141RX, 10-9516RP, 10-10105RP (Dec. 9, 2010).
51
See, e.g., Respondent’s Motion for Continuance, Etienne v. Dep’t of Children and
Family Servs., Nos. 10-5141RX, 10-9516RP, 10-10105RP (Jan. 7, 2011).
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of Fiscal Accountability and Regulatory Reform)” (“EO 11-01”).52 The
order cited several principles as its foundation, including the governor’s
responsibilities for planning and budget and ensuring faithful compliance
with the laws.53 EO 11-01 also stated “the administration of each state
agency, unless otherwise provided in the Constitution, shall be placed by law
under the direct supervision of the Governor . . . .” This inaccurately
rendered the principle that the governor has constitutional authority to direct
and supervise executive branch departments headed by his or her at-will
appointees.54
The purpose of EO 11-01 was to ensure all agencies performed their
duties, including regulatory actions and rulemaking, efficiently and
effectively, with the least adverse economic impact on regulated entities or
the general public. In the order, the governor designated a section in the
Executive Office of the Governor (“EOG”)55 as the Office of Fiscal
Accountability and Regulatory Reform (“OFARR”), to implement this
purpose.56 Among other responsibilities, the order charged OFARR with:
(1) reviewing proposed or existing agency rules for compliance with the
governor’s policy initiatives; (2) requiring agencies to assess the cost,
benefit, risk, and effect on employment of each proposed rule; (3) identifying
waste, fraud, or mismanagement in agency programs and recommending
solutions; and (4) coordinating with other governmental accountability
offices to identify rules disproportionately impacting small businesses.57
The order required agencies “under the direction of the Governor” to
designate a liaison to meet several responsibilities, including preparing
annual regulatory plans to identify rules for amendment or repeal, and
statutory mandates adversely impacting private businesses.58
EO 11-01 required agencies under the governor’s direction to suspend
pending rulemaking and submit all prospective rules for review and approval
by the governor’s office.59 The key was whether the agency was a
52

See Fla. Exec. Order No. 2011-01 (Jan. 4, 2011).
FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 1(a). The clause stating this authority was not part of the original
language adopted in 1968 but was amended into the text as part of Revision Number 1
submitted by the Taxation and Budget Reform Commission and approved by the voters on
November 3, 1992.
54
Id. at §§ 1(a), 6.
55
FLA. STAT. § 14.201 (1979). This is an administrative unit of the executive branch for
which the governor is denominated expressly as the agency head.
56
Fla. Exec. Order No. 2011-01, § 3.
57
Id.
58
Id. at § 5.
59
Id. at §§ 1, 4. The order also imposed a 90-day period during which agencies had to
obtain OFARR approval before executing contracts exceeding $1 million in value. Id. at § 6.
Agencies not under the governor’s direction were requested to participate in the suspension
and review processes established by the Order. Id. at § 2.
53
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“Governor’s agency” subject to his direction and supervision; the order drew
a distinction from those agencies clearly placed under another constitutional
entity. The use of this distinction is understandable based on the history and
tradition of the constitutional offices and statutory precedent. When creating
the Citizen’s Assistance Office within the EOG in 1979, the legislature
authorized it to “[i]nvestigate . . . any administrative action of any state
agency, the administration of which is under the direct supervision of the
Governor . . . .”60 The Office of Suicide Prevention, administratively housed
in DCF, receives information and support from “[a]gencies under the control
of the Governor or the Governor and Cabinet . . . .”61 Finally, the Chief
Inspector General is responsible “for promoting accountability, integrity,
and efficiency in the agencies under the jurisdiction of the Governor.”62
Each statute, while worded differently, conveys the same concept—the
legislature recognizes the governor’s authority over a number of
administrative agencies beyond the EOG.
EO 11-01 clearly conflicted with statutory law on one point: the
governor ordered the secretary of state not to publish rulemaking notices
unless directed by OFARR.63 A major concern of the APA’s comprehensive
1974 revision was providing timely public notice of agency action and
meetings of public bodies at which dispositive action may or would be taken.
As of January 2011, the APA required the Department of State to publish
weekly information pertaining to agency actions online and in print,
including notices of public hearings, public meetings, rule development,
filing of proposed rules, adoption of rules, and summaries of rule objections
filed by the legislative Joint Administrative Procedures Committee.64 As the
statute allowed neither the governor nor the secretary of state65 to prevent
such publication, failure to publish could have subjected the department and
the secretary to legal action.
C. Impact of EO 11-01 on the Etienne Litigation
In Etienne the ALJ’s ruling on the motions for summary final order was
still pending on January 7, 2011, when DCF asserted two grounds to continue
60

FLA. STAT. § 14.26(2)(a) (2011) (emphasis added).
FLA. STAT. § 14.2019(4) (2011) (emphasis added).
62
FLA. STAT. § 14.32(1) (2011) (emphasis added).
63
This is inconsistent with FLA. STAT. §§ 120.55(1)(b), (2) (2011). The order could have
been executed in compliance with law through OFARR approving the mandatory weekly
publication.
64
In the 2012 Session the legislature revised the publication requirement. The electronic
format is now mandatory, and the publication is called the Florida Administrative Register.
2012 Fla. Laws 63, § 2; see also FLA. STAT § 120.55 (2018).
65
See FLA. STAT. § 20.10(1) (2011). The Secretary of State is the head of the Department
of State.
61
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the final hearing scheduled for March. First, the deadline for filing proposed
changes to the disputed form by the USDA was March 23, and DCF would
be required to implement the resulting decision. DCF argued waiting for
final guidance from the USDA was reasonable, and there was no need for a
final order prior to that time.66 Second, EO 11-01 suspended current
rulemaking, and any changes to the form required by the USDA would also
require OFARR approval before the revised form could be adopted.67
Etienne opposed a continuance on several grounds. She argued the
anticipated USDA review and comment were not relevant to and could not
moot the pending challenge, which would stand or fall on its own merits.68
She alleged DCF’s repeated statements of intent to commence rulemaking at
some unspecified future time were not in themselves good cause for a
continuance.69 Further, EO 11-01 had no bearing on the consolidated cases
because DCF demonstrated no attempt to comply with the “seemingly
innocuous restriction” of requesting OFARR approval to commence
rulemaking.70 Finally, Etienne argued the governor had no power to suspend
rulemaking under the APA, and EO 11-01 violated the constitutional
separation of powers by encroaching on the legislative authority exercised
by adopting the APA.71
On January 24, 2011, the ALJ abated the proceedings solely by
concluding that EO 11-01 suspended rulemaking.72 The ALJ postponed
further action in the matter until OFARR reviewed the proposed form and
DCF could proceed with rulemaking.73 A subsequent order on April 20,
2011, clearly stated the sole basis for the original abatement was to
accommodate the OFARR review.74 Etienne appealed this non-final order,
raising, among other points, her argument that EO 11-01 unconstitutionally
suspended certain agency rulemaking, and requested the appellate court lift

66

Respondent’s Motion for Continuance, Etienne v. Dep’t of Children and Family
Servs., supra note 51.
67
Id.
68
Petitioner’s Response to Respondent’s Motion for Continuance at 2–3, Etienne v.
Dep’t of Children and Family Servs., Nos. 10-5141RX, 10-9516RP, 10-10105RP (Jan. 12,
2011).
69
Id. at 4.
70
Id. at 5.
71
Id. at 5–6.
72
Order Canceling Hearing and Placing Cases in Abeyance, Etienne v. Dep’t of Children
and Family Servs., Nos. 10-5141RX, 10-9516RP, 10-10105RP (Jan. 24, 2011). The ALJ did
note the USDA preliminary review found the proposed revised form still did not comply with
federal regulations.
73
Id.
74
Order Continuing Case in Abeyance and Requiring Status Report, Etienne v. Dep’t of
Children and Family Servs., Nos. 10-5141RX, 10-9516RP, 10-10105RP (Apr. 20, 2011).
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the abatement.75 DCF completed the OFARR review process and notified
the ALJ that the conditions of the abatement were met.76 The ALJ noted the
abatement could not be lifted while the interlocutory appeal on that issue was
pending,77 and the appellate court temporarily relinquished jurisdiction so
the ALJ could act.78 Ultimately, all three cases were dismissed as moot once
DCF ceased using the challenged form.79
III. THE ISSUES: PRESENTATION, ARGUMENT, AND ANALYSIS
A. Point: Whiley and Amici
Like Etienne, Whiley received food purchase assistance through SNAP,
and she periodically was required to recertify her need for continuing
benefits.80 Whiley preferred to use the available online application.81 She
alleged the online form required more than minimum information to initiate
the process, in violation of USDA policy,82 similarly being argued in the
Etienne litigation. Rather than join the pending administrative challenges to
the very same rulemaking or bring one of the actions available to try the facts
fully and obtain direct relief for the alleged violation of her rights,83 Whiley
petitioned the Florida Supreme Court to issue a writ of quo warranto against
the governor.84

75

Administrative Petition to Review Non-Final Agency Action, Etienne v. Dep’t of
Children and Family Servs., No. 3D11-461 (Feb. 23, 2011).
76
Notice that Condition of Order Cancelling Hearing and Placing Cases in Abeyance
has been Met and Motion for a Status Conference, Etienne v. Dep’t of Children and Family
Servs., Nos. 10-5141RX, 10-9516RP, 10-10105RP (Apr. 13, 2011).
77
Order Continuing Case in Abeyance and Requiring Status Report, supra note 74.
78
Order Granting Temporary Relinquishment on Court’s Own Motion, No. 3D11-461
(May 10, 2011). The ALJ lifted the abatement by order dated May 25, 2011.
79
Final Order of Dismissal, Etienne v. Dep’t of Children and Family Servs., Nos. 105141RX, 10-9516RP, 10-10105RP (July 21, 2011).
80
65A FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 1.205(2) (2010).
81
Affidavit of Rosalie Whiley incorporated into Appendix to Petition for Writ of Quo
Warranto, Whiley v. Scott, No. SC11-592 (March 28, 2011).
82
Petition for Writ of Quo Warranto, supra note 4, at 6.
83
For example, Whiley could have alleged the actions of DCF violated her rights as
secured by the federal laws governing SNAP and brought an action for declaratory and
injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in U.S. District Court. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2010).
Alternatively, she could have brought such an action in the applicable Florida Circuit Court,
as Florida Circuit Courts have all original jurisdiction not otherwise vested by law in the local
county courts. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 5(b); FLA. STAT. § 26.021. Finally, she could have sought
declaratory and injunctive relief under FLA. STAT. § 86.011.
84
Petition for Writ of Quo Warranto, supra note 4. The Florida Supreme Court has
developed the use of proceedings in quo warranto to test not only whether an individual
properly occupies a public office, but also whether an officer or agency exercised a proper
right or power. See Florida House of Representatives v. Crist, 999 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 2008);
Martinez v. Martinez, 545 So. 2d 1338, 1339 (Fla. 1989).
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The petition alleged that EO 11-01 improperly suspended
administrative rulemaking because the governor had no such authority.85
Expanding on the point asserted in Etienne, counsel for Whiley conflated
narrow readings of two constitutional principles to argue the governor had
no authority to direct, supervise, or control at-will appointed agency heads
in the conduct of administrative rulemaking.86 First, the petition correctly
stated rulemaking is a legislative function and may be delegated to executive
branch agencies (hence, to the officials of such agencies) only under specific
restrictions and guidelines.87 However, Whiley went beyond the concept of
a strict separation of powers in the Florida Constitution by arguing all actions
pertaining to agency rulemaking, from initial conception to final adoption,
were solely controlled by the legislature as an exclusively legislative
power.88 She argued the governor had only such power to direct, supervise,
or control executive branch agencies and their exercise of delegated
rulemaking authority as was prescribed by statute, and that the legislature
made rulemaking the exclusive prerogative of the agency heads. Because
they were required to exercise this authority independently, the governor
could not order any suspension of rulemaking.89
Whiley’s theory hinged on the constitutional phrase “or an officer or
board appointed by and serving at the pleasure of the governor . . . .”90 The
word “or” at the beginning of the constitutional clause could be read as a
conjunctive, grammatically completing the list of officials from which the
legislature could choose one alternative to directly administer a particular
agency. This reading is consistent with Florida’s historical understanding
and application of executive power, with prior precedent of the Supreme
Court, and with the text of the Florida Constitution. However, citing AGO
81-49, Whiley applied a disjunctive reading and argued the Constitution
authorized the legislature to apportion all executive branch power over a
particular agency function to one of the denominated officials, excluding any
gubernatorial authority over the agency (with the exception of removing
those appointees serving at the governor’s pleasure).91 This novel
interpretation meant the legislature was authorized to create a category of
state officials who: (1) were appointed by the governor, not elected by the
people; (2) served at the pleasure of the governor; (3) had the power to
control the functions of their respective agencies without gubernatorial

85
86
87
88
89
90
91

Petition for Writ of Quo Warranto, supra note 4, at 3.
Id. at 1–2, 15–16.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 11–12.
FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 6.
Petition for Writ of Quo Warranto, supra note 4, at 11, 15–16.
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direction or supervision; and thus (4) were not amenable to gubernatorial
direction to follow a particular policy when implementing the laws within
the jurisdiction of their particular agencies. By implication, Whiley posited
the legislature statutorily allotted certain executive branch functions beyond
the direction, supervision, or control of the governor and every elected
officer. The governor’s authority to remove an at-will appointee therefore
was irrelevant to the supervision and control of a program placed under such
an agency head. Whiley acknowledged that Article IV, section 1(a), vested
supreme executive power in the governor but dismissed its relevance by
arguing this section conferred neither the power to suspend the operation of
a statute nor the authority of direct control over agency rulemaking, absent
an express grant from the legislature.92 Essentially, Whiley argued that in
delegating rulemaking authority the legislature co-opted the assigned official
to the exclusion of the executive power vested in the governor.
The petition included some collateral issues. She alleged the
designation of OFARR in EO 11-01 created a new state agency to which the
governor transferred the rulemaking authority statutorily vested in the
agency heads.93 A plain reading of the order showed the governor acted
under his authority to designate an operational function within the EOG and
to delegate the oversight necessary to supervise and control certain
administrative agency functions. Whiley’s argument was spurious. The
name of the office was thus irrelevant insofar as it denoted those employees
of EOG tasked with duties in support of the governor’s exercise of an
oversight function.94
Whiley also argued that requiring OFARR approval, before “governordirected” agencies could proceed with rulemaking, effectively transferred
the ultimate decision to propose and adopt rules to OFARR.95 She contended
this violated the separation of powers and deprived the public of the
procedural safeguards in the APA.96 This issue is interesting because she
began by correctly stating part of EO 11-01 improperly attempted to abrogate
the statute by ordering a suspension of all rulemaking publication, but then
speculated the APA would be flagrantly violated if administrative agencies
complied with the order.97 Whiley failed to show EO 11-01 actually
compelled or encouraged any agency to violate the APA.98 She could only
92

Id. at 11–12.
Id. at 2–5, 16, 18, 21.
94
Just as easily, the Governor could have called this office “Bob” without any change in
its assigned function.
95
Petition for Writ of Quo Warranto, supra note 4, at 21–24.
96
Id. at 14–18.
97
Id. at 26.
98
The exception previously noted affected publication of notices in the Florida
Administrative Weekly, a statutory requirement that could have been satisfied by timely
93
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show where agencies relied on EO 11-01 as justifying their own suspensions
of rulemaking.99
This argument demonstrated the irreconcilable paradox in Whiley’s
position. If the speculative violations of the APA could occur only because
agencies chose to comply with EO 11-01, the governor had no inherent
authority to order any suspension and the agencies were free to choose to
proceed with the statutory requirements of the APA. Thus, the petition was
not well-taken because the proper remedy was against the DCF officials who
declined to conduct timely rulemaking.100 However, if the governor’s
directive bound agencies headed by at-will gubernatorial appointees,
whether issued as a formal executive order or communicated less formally,
the petition in quo warranto was not well-taken because the governor acted
according to a valid power. The proper remedy then would be an action in
circuit court challenging the suspension.101
After various amici filed briefs and the governor filed his response,
Whiley’s amended reply attempted to reinforce her major argument through
an inverted interpretation of the Florida Constitution. She asserted the
governor’s powers were limited to those expressly “spelled out in the
Constitution or statutes,” and, despite the express vesting of executive power
in Article IV, section 1(a), the governor’s power over state agencies was
“limited to whatever the Constitution and the statutes grant him.”102 This
construction directly conflicted with the clear language and intent of Article
IV, section 1(a), vesting the people’s executive power in the governor,
subject to express limitations, rather than the inverse—a grant only of
specifically expressed powers. Whiley’s appeal to history—”[t]he Governor
has taken extraordinary action beyond that of any previous governor and an
extraordinary writ is necessary”103—even if allowed as rhetorical license,
cannot substantiate such hyperbole when considered in light of Florida’s
historical implementation of executive power.104
The court granted leave to file briefs as amicus curiae to three entities
supporting Whiley.105 Reiterating her primary points, each amicus
OFARR action.
99
Petition for Writ of Quo Warranto, supra note 4, at 27–28.
100
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 120.54(1)(a) (requiring an agency to adopt a rule “as soon as
feasible and practicable.”); see also FLA. STAT. § 120.54(3)(a) (expressly requiring the agency
head to approve providing the statutory notice of rulemaking.).
101
See Martinez v. Martinez, 545 So. 2d 1338, 1339 (Fla. 1989). Other issues raised in
the original petition were derivative or duplicative of the main arguments considered by the
court.
102
Petitioner’s Amended Reply, at 4, 15, Whiley v. Scott, 79 So. 3d 702 (Fla. 2011) (No.
SC11-592).
103
Id. at 30.
104
Miller, Direction and Supervision, supra note 17, at 349–351.
105
Brief for Florida Audubon Society as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Whiley v.
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advocated the analysis of AGO 81-49 and argued the placing of
administrative departments under appointed agency heads, pursuant to
Article IV, section 6, precluded the governor from exercising any
supervision or control over the rulemaking functions of those agencies.106
Each amicus argued EO 11-01 was an attempt to usurp the rulemaking
authority delegated by the legislature, violating the separation of powers
doctrine.107
The Florida Audubon Society argued the governor’s supreme executive
power did not inherently include the authority to control all executive
agencies, because Article IV, section 1(a), expressly authorized the governor
to “require information in writing from all executive or administrative state,
county or municipal officers upon any subject relating to the duties of their
respective offices.”108 If the governor had inherent constitutional power to
direct executive branch officers, Florida Audubon posited there would have
been no need to spell out this particular power.109 Therefore, the vested
executive power did not imply any additional authority over executive
agencies beyond that specified in the Constitution or established by
statute.110 This argument fails on a clear reading of the entire text of Article
IV, section 1(a).
The Constitution authorizes the governor to require written information
from all officers and entities of the executive branch, including separately
elected officers such as the Commissioner of Agriculture, separate
constitutional entities such as the Fish and Wildlife Conservation
Commission, and executives of county or municipal governments.111
Because the Constitution places these officers and entities outside the
governor’s general authority, such express exception to this alternate
allocation of executive power was necessary for the governor to require all
Scott, 79 So. 3d 702 (Fla. 2011) (No. SC11-592); Brief for Disability Rights Florida as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Whiley v. Scott, 79 So. 3d 702 (Fla. 2011) (No. SC11592); Brief for Academy of Florida Elder Law Attorneys and the Elder Law Section of the
Florida Bar as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Whiley v. Scott, 79 So. 3d 702 (Fla.
2011) (No. SC11-592).
106
Brief for Florida Audubon Society as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note
105, at 6; Brief for Disability Rights Florida as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra
note 105, at 4–5; Brief for Academy of Florida Elder Law Attorneys and the Elder Law
Section of the Florida Bar as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 105, at 3–4.
107
Brief for Florida Audubon Society as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note
105, at 10; Brief for Disability Rights Florida as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra
note 105, at 3-5; Brief for Academy of Florida Elder Law Attorneys and the Elder Law Section
of the Florida Bar as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 105, at 2–3.
108
Brief for Florida Audubon Society as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note
105, at 6–7.
109
Id. at 6.
110
Id. at 6–7.
111
See FLA. CONST. art. IV, §§ 4(d), 9; FLA. CONST. art. VIII, §§ 1, 2.
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such officers to provide written information. Granting the governor
authority over other officers does not imply a lack of inherent authority over
the governor’s own at-will subordinate appointees.
Another amicus argued policy considerations, some outside the scope
of a quo warranto petition.112 Disability Rights Florida argued the governor
should not be “allowed” to “exercise ultimate discretion” over rulemaking
because that would presume a subject matter expertise he did not possess.113
The flaw in this argument is that Article IV sets no criteria or qualifications
for individuals chosen to head agencies or serve on licensing boards. Where
particular expertise is necessary, both the Constitution and statutes expressly
state the required qualifications.114
B. Counterpoint: The Governor and The Attorney General
1. Executive Order 11-72
The governor filed a formal response to the petition on May 12, 2011,
but the actual response began more than a month before with the
promulgation of Executive Order 11-72 (“EO 11-72”),115 expressly
superseding EO 11-01. The preamble of EO 11-72 incorporated many of the
policy statements set out in EO 11-01, recited OFARR’s achievements, and
reiterated key provisions of Article IV, sections 1(a) and 6.116 EO 11-72
differed by eliminating the suspension of both agency rulemaking and
publication by the Department of State.117 The order confirmed the utility of
OFARR and continued its delegation of authority to review and approve
prospective rules, without renewing its earlier duties to investigate agency

112

Brief for Disability Rights Florida as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note
105, at 7–8.
113
Id. at 8.
114
The attorney general must meet the same basic constitutional requirements for office
as the governor and other cabinet members but also must be a licensed attorney in Florida for
the 5 years preceding election to office. FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 6. When necessary, the
legislature expressly states the specific qualifications to head certain agencies, such as the
director of the Office of Insurance Regulation. FLA. STAT. § 20.121(3)(d) (2018).
115
See Fla. Exec. Order No. 2011-72 (April 8, 2011).
116
FLA. CONST. art. IV, §§ 1(a), 6.
117
As noted in the discussion of EO 11-01, part of that order would have required the
Secretary of State to violate the clear requirements of FLA. STAT. § 120.55 (2010). The
Department of State in fact published the Florida Administrative Weekly on January 7, 2011.
Due to the timing of publication requirements, that publication was already in process when
EO 11-01 was issued and could not be “suspended.” The department complied with the order
and did not publish an issue on January 14, 2011. Publication resumed on January 21, 2011,
apparently because the department had an opportunity to confer with the governor’s office
and clarify the statute’s mandate on weekly publication. See Florida Administative Code and
Florida Administrative Register, FLA. DEPT. OF STATE (last visited Nov. 27, 2018),
https://www.flrules.org/bigDoc/Default.asp?Year=2011.
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fraud and mismanagement.118
The order continued to call for a
comprehensive review of all existing rules and to repeal those that were
duplicative, unnecessary, or obsolete.119
Because the governor issued EO 11-72 after Whiley filed her petition,
the order’s preamble stated the “administering, planning, and budgeting for
the State is inextricably intertwined with the agency rulemaking process,”
anticipating the court’s central focus on the role of gubernatorial oversight
of agency rulemaking.120 This finding foreshadowed the governor’s central
argument before the court: to give full effect to the plain language in Article
IV, the governor has broad authority to meet his responsibilities, and this
authority inherently resides in the comprehensive, plenary executive power
vested by the people.121 Unless a facet of executive authority is expressly
placed by the Constitution in another official or entity, the full executive
power remains with the governor pursuant to Article IV, section 1(a). Under
this interpretation, Article IV, section 6, authorizes the legislature to organize
the executive branch in a standardized fashion for management purposes,
removing the overarching organizational authority from the governor and
cabinet. However, the section does not authorize the legislature to apportion
executive power in any manner that dilutes the authority expressly vested in
the constitutional executive officers.
2. The Governor’s Response to the Petition
Counsel for the governor faced a classic dilemma in crafting the
response. On one hand, the historical understanding and implementation of
executive branch power in Florida, as well as other states and the federal
government, clearly refuted Whiley’s argument that the governor lacked
authority over appointed at-will agency heads, other than the power of
removal.122 There was no basis for the case and apparently no advantage for
the governor to acquiesce and participate in the proceeding. In fact,
addressing the merits of the petition could arguably be deemed as seeking an
advisory opinion from the Supreme Court about the governor’s
constitutional powers.123 On the other hand, not participating and opposing
the petition risked the court issuing a writ on arguably invalid grounds, even
though the court had neither asserted personal jurisdiction over the
118

Fla. Exec. Order No. 2011-72, supra note 115, at § 3.
Id. at § 6.
120
Id. at § 2.
121
Response to Petition for Writ of Quo Warranto, at 35, Whiley v. Scott, 79 So. 3d 702
(Fla. 2011) (No. SC11-592).
122
Id. at 35–50.
123
FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 1(c) (“The governor may request in writing the opinion of the
justices of the supreme court as to the interpretation of any portion of this constitution upon
any question affecting the governor’s executive powers and duties.”).
119
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governor124 nor possessed the means to enforce any resulting order. Ignoring
such a writ could precipitate a public opinion maelstrom fueled by incendiary
media commentary, since the decision would likely be issued in the summer,
a traditionally slow news time in Florida save for the occasional tropical
cyclonic event. Choosing to respond, the governor raised the proper and
valid historical, precedential, and constitutional grounds to dismiss the
petition but also overextended some of those very points.125
The response argued three overarching themes. First, relief through
quo warranto was not appropriate because Whiley had legal remedies
readily available if there was a true violation of the APA.126 Many of her
arguments or those by her amici were based on hypothetical transgressions
of the APA, not actual facts.127 Their arguments about OFARR only
amounted to policy challenges for which the APA itself provided ample
avenues for relief, far from showing a constitutional crisis precipitated by
EO 11-01.128 Second, challenging OFARR as the vehicle through which the
governor implemented a program of administrative oversight, did not raise a
separation of powers issue because the exercise of intra-branch authority did
not create an inter-branch conflict.129 Each valid legislative delegation of
rulemaking authority necessarily required the executive branch to exercise
some discretion in adopting rules.130 Properly exercising such discretion
incorporated the fact that appointed agency heads were not autonomous but
deferred to the guidance and policies of the governor. Third, whether by
executive order or informal communication, the constitutional powers vested
and duties imposed under Article IV provided ample authority for
gubernatorial oversight of certain executive departments, as demonstrated by
Florida’s long history of gubernatorial direction of agencies and
rulemaking.131
Arguing that debatable policy choices are no basis for an exercise of
quo warranto jurisdiction, the governor characterized the petition as nothing
124

See Order-Response/Reply Requested (Spec. Issue), Whiley v. Scott, 79 So. 3d 702
(Fla. 2011) (No. SC11-592). Rather than issue a summons or other attempt to compel the
appearance of the governor, on April 4, 2011, the Supreme Court issued a request for the
governor to respond to the petition and briefs of amicus by April 25, 2011.
125
Response to Petition for Writ of Quo Warranto, supra note 121.
126
Id. at 24–25.
127
Id. at 12–14; Brief for Florida Audubon Society as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioner, supra note 105, at 2, 11–13; Brief for Disability Rights Florida as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioner, supra note 105, at 8–12; Brief for Academy of Florida Elder Law
Attorneys and the Elder Law Section of the Florida Bar as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioner, supra note 105, at 4–6.
128
Response to Petition for Writ of Quo Warranto, supra note 121, at 28–29.
129
Id. at 27.
130
Id. at 26.
131
Id. at 30–46.
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more than a mere collection of alleged violations of the APA for which the
Act itself provided complete process and remedies.132 In fact, the APA does
not even apply to executive orders issued pursuant to the governor’s
constitutional authority.133 However, this argument left open the question of
how to resolve issues of legislative authority under Article IV, section 6. The
remedies available under the APA could not address whether a statute, which
placed a department under the direct administration of a non-elected agency
head appointed by and serving at the pleasure of the governor, made that
bureaucrat constitutionally autonomous from any gubernatorial direction and
supervision until removed from office. Questions about the governor’s
constitutional power are outside the scope of the APA and cannot be
adjudicated in an administrative challenge.134 Conversely, a declaratory
judgment action filed in the appropriate Florida Circuit Court could
appropriately challenge any rulemaking done pursuant to allegedly
unauthorized gubernatorial direction or an act taken in contravention of such
direction.135
On the merits, the governor stated the creation of OFARR within the
EOG did not violate the separation of powers doctrine because OFARR was
not a new administrative agency.136 Derived solely from the governor’s
authority over his own staff, OFARR exercised no power expressly allotted
by the Constitution or delegated by statute.137 OFARR’s review and
approval of certain rulemaking decisions did not improperly revise the APA,
but was instead a structured internal process chosen by the governor to
supervise those agencies headed by appointees serving at his pleasure.138
OFARR’s supervision of agency rulemaking was derived only from the
governor’s existing authority.139 This “intra-branch authority” to direct
agency heads in their duties—including administrative rulemaking—in turn
was rooted in the governor’s power to remove certain agency heads at will.
The “power to remove is the power to control.”140
Each agency authorized to implement substantive law through

132

Id. at 25.
See FLA. STAT. § 120.52(1) (2016).
134
Myers v. Hawkins, 362 So. 2d 926, 928 (Fla. 1978).
135
FLA. STAT. § 86.011 (2016). The clear advantages of such a proceeding include not
only the ability to develop a complete factual record but also opportunity for advocates to
fully develop the legal arguments before the trial court, with further refinement in the Florida
intermediate appellate courts. Such refinement of the arguments and the record would better
assist the Supreme Court in resolving any remaining issues requiring its attention.
136
Response to Petition for Writ of Quo Warranto, supra note 121, at 6, 31.
137
Id. at 6–8, 30–32.
138
Id. at 32–33, 50–56.
139
Id. at 21–23.
140
Id. at 33.
133
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rulemaking must comply with the express limitations and guidance in the
governing statute, using the process required by the APA.141 Within these
statutory parameters, the agency makes a number of policy choices before
rulemaking is complete, from initial internal decisions about the wording of
the proposed rule through deciding whether to revise the text before final
adoption. Some rulemaking tasks must be done only by each agency head,142
but this procedural requirement does not alter the relationship between the
governor and the agency head. Contrary to Whiley’s contention, at-will
appointees are not autonomous from gubernatorial control. With the sole
power to remove appointed agency heads serving at his pleasure, the
governor has the authority and responsibility to direct these appointees about
the policy choices that would result in retention or removal.143 By ignoring
this principle, Whiley and supportive amici effectively read Article IV,
section 1(a) out of the Constitution.
The governor argued that Whiley’s own rationale proved the petition
should be denied, noting that if his order actually controlled the exercise of
rulemaking authority by at-will appointed agency heads, the case was moot,
and the court could not issue the writ because the governor exercised a valid
constitutional power.144 However, assuming arguendo the agency heads
were autonomous, the petition was also moot because the agency heads could
choose to ignore the order and avoid the adverse impacts speculated by
Whiley.145 If agency heads voluntarily choose to comply with the executive
order and submit rulemaking decisions to the OFARR process, any
violations of the APA flowed from that choice, making the agency heads the
proper parties in any challenge.146
Additionally, arguing against the merits of the petition, the governor
referred to the numerous executive orders by prior Florida governors
expressly directing and controlling agency rulemaking, as evidence of the
historical understanding of the authority vested through the express language
of Article IV, section 1.147 In conjunction with the other terms in section
141

FLA. STAT. § 120.536(1) (2018).
See FLA. STAT. § 120.54(1)(k) (2018). For example, the agency head must approve the
notice of proposed rule required by FLA. STAT. § 120.54(3)(a)1.
143
Response to Petition for Writ of Quo Warranto, supra note 121, at 32 n. 13, 58.
144
Id. at 30–32.
145
The governor’s argument tacitly acknowledged that an executive order does not have
the force of law, unlike a properly enacted bill which the governor approves. See FLA. CONST.
art. III, §§ 6–8. The legislature by statute has authorized certain declarations of the governor
as having the force of law. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 14.021 (2018) (promulgation and
enforcement of rules and regulations during a lawfully declared emergency); § 501.160(2)
(2018) (selling essential commodities for an unconscionable price during a declared state of
emergency, or “price gouging”).
146
Response to Petition for Writ of Quo Warranto, supra note 121, at 32 n.13.
147
Id. at 41–46.
142
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1(a), the duty to ensure faithful execution of the laws implied a broad scope
for the executive power because the court’s own precedents found proper
performance of this duty was essential to the orderly conduct of
government.148 The governor asserted this interpretation aligned with the
positions of the federal government and the majority of states.149 Pointing to
the statute that created the Chief Inspector General’s duties in the EOG, the
governor’s argument noted the legislature recognized the authority of the
governor over those executive branch agencies for which direct
administration was placed in an at-will appointee.150 Finally, the governor
pointed out the inconsistency of Whiley and the amici urging their position
to preserve public reliance on agency head “expertise” in formulating agency
rules—an expertise the governor did not have—while concurrently arguing
against any executive branch discretion in implementing delegated
rulemaking.151 As the governor established earlier in his response, only
exercising the discretion inherent in delegated rulemaking authority
demonstrates this “expertise.”152
The governor’s argument correctly applied the historical interpretation
of executive power vested by the Florida Constitution. Reaching as far back
as Hamilton’s observation on the necessity for vigor in the executive
branch,153 and Madison’s summation about the centrality of “appointing,
overseeing, and controlling those who execute the laws,”154 the governor’s
response argued the historical separation of powers in American
constitutionalism continued to inform interpretations about the nature and
extent of executive power.155 The governor argued that the longstanding
practices of chief executives over time became part of the structure of
government and a meaningful interpretation of the vested executive
power.156 Building on this premise, the governor read the provisions of
Article IV, sections 1 and 6 together. The governor applied the court’s
precedents on constitutional interpretation to establish the clear and orderly
authority for directing and supervising the exercise of delegated rulemaking
148

Id. at 38–39 (citing In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 290 So. 2d 473, 475 (Fla.
1974); Finch v. Fitzpatrick, 254 So. 2d 203, 204 (Fla. 1971)).
149
Id. at 46, 49.
150
FLA. STAT. § 14.32(2)(d), (i) (2011) (authorizing the Chief Inspector General both to
examine records of “any agency the administration of which is under the direct supervision
of the Governor,” and to act as liaison and monitor of inspectors general “in the agencies
under the Governor’s jurisdiction.”).
151
Response to Petition for Writ of Quo Warranto, supra note 121, at 64.
152
Id. at 64.
153
Id. at 65 (quoting from THE FEDERALIST No. 70 (Alexander Hamilton)).
154
Id. at 37 (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 481 (1789).
155
Id. at 53–54.
156
Id. at 46 (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610–11
(1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
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authority by at-will appointees.157 Thus, the governor answered the petition
by demonstrating the power he had in the first place.158
The court declined to dismiss the petition on jurisdictional grounds or
in the interest of judicial prudence. Even so, the governor could have
obviated any further discussion about deferring to agency expertise by noting
the sparing use of express qualifications for officials in both the Constitution
and statute. The Constitution clearly states when “special expertise” is a
prerequisite to take office,159 and the legislature expressly limits certain
agency heads to particular qualifications.160 As most offices do not require
particular expertise or training in a field prior to an official’s election or
appointment, Whiley and her amici’s reliance on this point was misplaced
and of little relevance.
3. The Attorney General’s Amicus Curiae Brief Supporting the
Governor
The Attorney General’s amicus brief focused on the state’s substantial
interest in preserving the proper authority over executive branch agencies,
vested in elected officers who are directly accountable to the voters, refuting
Whiley’s theory of independently-operating agency heads.161 The Attorney
General argued the unique facts underlying AGO 81-49 rendered its
rationale unpersuasive in this case.162 AGO 81-49 failed to address the
constitutional vesting of supreme executive power in the governor in the
context of the governor’s responsibility to supervise executive branch
agencies.163 Further, subsequent developments in the Constitution and the
law made this opinion irrelevant.164
The amicus brief complemented the governor’s argument—the powers
vested and duties imposed in Article IV, section 1, establish the broad scope
of the executive power to control administrative agencies headed by at-will

157

Response to Petition for Writ of Quo Warranto, supra note 121, at 32–41.
Id.
159
FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 5(b) (providing that the Attorney General must be a member of
the Florida Bar for at least 5 years preceding election to office, but suggesting there is no
similar requirement for skill or training imposed on the Governor, Chief Financial Officer, or
Commissioner of Agriculture.).
160
See FLA. STAT. § 20.43(2)(a) (2018) (stating that the State Surgeon General must be a
licensed doctor with “advanced training or extensive experience” in public health
administration); see also FLA. STAT. § 20.23(1)(b) (2018) (specific education and experience
relevant to transportation systems is required for the Secretary of the Department of
Transportation).
161
Amicus Brief of the Attorney General in Support of Respondent, supra note 35, at 1.
162
Id. at 15.
163
Id. at 16.
164
Id. at 17.
158
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gubernatorial appointees.165 An interpretation finding that these appointees
exercise authority, independent from any direction of the governor, fails to
comport with the constitutional principles establishing political
accountability in the governor for the actions of administrative agencies.166
Such an interpretation implies a diffusion of executive power beyond the
limitations expressly stated in the Constitution, precluding the ability of the
voters to hold anyone accountable for agency action.167 Because the
governor was acting under proper constitutional authority, absent a clear
violation of law, separation of powers principles called for judicial
deference, and the court was urged to refrain from reviewing and secondguessing the governor’s use of OFARR to implement his policies regarding
agency rulemaking.168
Interestingly, the Attorney General flatly stated reliance on AGO 81-49
was “unwarranted,” and argued three points, all but receding from the
previously-dormant opinion.169 First, the facts of the opinion were
inapposite to the pending petition. The Attorney General’s unrebutted
summary of those facts showed that the governor in 1981 sought to exercise
complete control over every aspect of agency compliance, implementation,
and enforcement of the Coastal Management Program, effectively co-opting
the entire rulemaking function.170 In contrast, EO 11-01 imposed a clearly
restrained supervision of rulemaking done by gubernatorial appointees;171
there was no usurpation of the requirements in the APA. Second, in 1992,
the people increased the scope of the governor’s authority over state agencies
by amending article IV, section 1(a), to add the final clause: “[t]he governor
shall be the chief administrative officer of the state responsible for the
planning and budgeting for the state . . . ,” creating a different constitutional
context that effectively distinguished AGO 81-49.172 Third, statutory
changes subsequent to AGO 81-49 further limited any relevance of the
opinion.173 In short, the Attorney General argued AGO 81-49 was an
anachronism with no current utility.174

165
Id. at 4–8; see Response to Petition for Writ of Quo Warranto, supra note 121, at 35–
36, 38–41.
166
Amicus Brief of the Attorney General, supra note 35, at 5.
167
Id. at 6.
168
Id. at 10–11.
169
Id. at 15–17.
170
Id. at 15.
171
Id. at 15–16.
172
Amicus Brief of the Attorney General, supra note 35, at 16–17.
173
Id. at 16–17. See FLA. STAT. § 20.051 (2018), created by 1994 Fla. Laws 235 § 5.
174
Amicus Brief of the Attorney General, supra note 35, at 17.
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IV. THE MAJORITY OPINION AND THE DISSENTS
Five Justices175 concurred in a per curiam opinion granting the petition
but withholding the requested writ.176 The majority viewed the case as a
question on the respective authorities of the governor and the legislature
concerning agency rulemaking proceedings:
Our precise task in this case is to decide whether the Governor has
overstepped his constitutional authority by issuing executive
orders which contain certain limitations and suspensions upon
agencies relating to their delegated legislative rulemaking
authority and the requirements related thereto.177
The majority concluded the governor lacked authority to issue EO 1101 and its successor, EO 11-72, on separation of powers grounds:
“[T]o the extent each suspends and terminates rulemaking by
precluding notice publication and other compliance with Chapter
120 absent prior approval from OFARR—contrary to the
Administrative Procedure Act—(the orders) infringe upon the
very process of rulemaking and encroach upon the Legislature’s
delegation of its rulemaking power as set forth in the Florida
Statutes.”178
The majority emphasized two concepts urged by Whiley. First, the
suspension of pending rulemaking by EO 11-01 and creation of the OFARR
review process altered the rulemaking procedure of the APA, violating the
constitutional separation of powers.179 Second, the governor could only
control rulemaking where the legislature placed the direct administration of
an agency under his authority.180 Essentially, the majority interpreted both
orders as unauthorized, binding statutory amendments. Further, the majority
creatively read article IV, section 6, as allowing the legislature to create a
category of subordinate executive branch officials, composed of appointed
agency heads serving at the pleasure of the governor.181 Under the majority’s
decision, these appointed agency heads apparently are empowered to
exercise the authority of their respective agencies independently and without
175

Whiley v. Scott, 79 So. 3d 702 (Fla. 2011) (per curiam). Justices Barbara J. Pariente,
R. Fred Lewis, Peggy A. Quince, Jorge Labarga, and James E.C. Perry joined this opinion.
See Whiley v. Scott, 79 So. 3d 702, 717 (Fla. 2011).
176
Whiley, 79 So. 3d at 702 (Polston, J., dissenting) (stating that by reaching a conclusion
but declining to issue any relief, the majority’s decision appeared to be more in the nature of
an advisory opinion under FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 1(c)); see also id. at 726. The Constitution
gives the court discretion whether to issue the writ, and the court adopted a similar outcome
in Fla. House of Representatives v. Crist, 999 So. 2d 601, 616 (Fla. 2008).
177
Id. at 708.
178
Id. at 713 (emphasis in original).
179
Id. at 705.
180
Id. at 715–716.
181
See FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 6.
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any direction or supervision by the governor.182
The dissenting justices refuted the majority’s presumptions based on
the actual language in the Florida Constitution, the statutes, and the
governor’s orders.183 Chief Justice Canady emphasized the traditional
reading of the Constitution and observed that Florida law imposes no
restriction on the authority of the governor to supervise and direct policy
choices made by subordinate executive branch officials regarding
rulemaking:
[T]he majority . . . [imposes] unprecedented and unwarranted
restrictions on the Governor’s constitutional authority to supervise
subordinate executive branch officers . . . . The majority’s
decision does not take seriously [the] reality that the rulemaking
process involves certain discretionary policy choices by executive
branch officers . . . . Nor does the majority come to terms with the
absence from Florida law of any restriction on the authority of the
Governor to supervise and control such policy choices made by
subordinate executive branch officials with respect to
rulemaking . . . . The Governor’s right to exercise such
supervision and control flows from the ‘supreme executive
power’ . . . together with the Governor’s power . . . to appoint
executive department heads who serve at the Governor’s
pleasure . . . . Given the constitutional structure establishing the
power and responsibilities of the Governor, it is unjustified to
conclude . . . that by assigning rulemaking power to agency heads,
the Legislature implicitly divested the Governor of his supervisory
power with respect to executive officials who serve at his
pleasure.184
Justice Polston agreed that “nothing in the APA prohibits the Governor
from performing executive oversight to ensure that the rulemaking process
at his agencies results in effective and efficient rules that accord with Florida
law.”185 He questioned the efficacy of proceeding in quo warranto since the
original order was superseded, and only hypothetical allegations about the
substance and effect of EO 11-72 remained.186 He particularly examined the
APA rulemaking procedure and the changes allegedly wrought by the
governor’s orders. Observing that rulemaking under the APA is a complex
but flexible process allowing for agency discretion and providing public
participation, he concluded the governor could implement EO 11-72 without

182
183
184
185
186

Whiley, 79 So. 3d at 714–15.
Id. at 717–26 (Fla. 2011).
Id. at 717–18 (Canady, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 724 (Polston, J., dissenting).
Id. at 718 (Polston, J., dissenting).
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violating the law.187 The governor did not attempt to suspend statutory time
limits for rulemaking; contrary to the assertions of Whiley and her amici,
and the conclusions of the majority, “[a]ll agencies remain subject to the
APA’s time limits, and the Governor remains constitutionally responsible
for ensuring that Florida’s laws, including the APA’s time limits, are
faithfully executed by the agencies under his supervision.”188
V. WHILEY V. SCOTT: AN ANALYSIS
The dissenting Justices were correct. By presuming a violation of the
APA, accepting as true Whiley’s unsubstantiated suppositions, and
considering only parts of the Florida Constitution without the full context
supplied by article IV, the majority neatly circumscribed their analysis. This
narrow frame made the rationale of AGO 81-49 appear plausible, leading the
majority to conclude that the governor could neither suspend rulemaking
within agencies nor direct the rulemaking policies of at-will appointed
agency heads because the legislature never created such positive authority.189
Based on Florida’s historical understanding and implementation of
constitutional executive power, the court’s own precedents, and the full text
of the Constitution, the majority was wrong.
A. The Majority Erroneously Presumed Some Abrogation or Violation
of the APA
Since Florida’s admission into the Union in 1845, every version of the
Florida Constitution required the strict separation of powers between the
three branches.190 “Strict” in the sense that no branch may delegate the whole
of its power for any purpose to another branch, nor may a branch presume to
exercise a power clearly belonging to another. This separation, however, is
not absolute, and permits the legislature to delegate rulemaking to executive
branch agencies.191 The separation of powers is applied practically, allowing
each branch to check and balance the others by zealously guarding its own
authority, preventing any one branch from exercising complete sovereign
power, and simultaneously forcing all branches to act in concert to operate a
workable government. Through this doctrine, Florida fulfills the basic
understanding of the U.S. Constitution:

187

Id. at 725 (Polston, J., dissenting).
Whiley, 79 So. 3d at 725.
189
Id. at 715–17.
190
See FLA. CONST. art. II, § 2 (1838); FLA. CONST. art. III (1868); FLA. CONST. art. II
(1885); FLA. CONST. art. II, § 3 (1968).
191
Bush v. Schiavo, 885 So. 2d 321, 332 (Fla. 2004); State v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co.,
47 So. 969 (Fla. 1908). See also Askew v. Cross Key Waterways, 372 So. 2d 913 (Fla. 1979);
Sloban v. Fla. Bd. of Pharm., 982 So. 2d 26 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
188
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The actual art of governing under our Constitution does not and
cannot conform to judicial definitions of the power of any of its
branches based on isolated clauses or even single Articles torn
from context. While the Constitution diffuses power the better to
secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate the
dispersed powers into a workable government. It enjoins upon its
branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but
reciprocity.192
In Florida, the separation of powers is not absolute because not every
governmental activity belongs exclusively to a single branch: “[t]here has
been no complete and definite designation by a paramount authority of all
the particular powers that appertain to each of the several departments.193
Perhaps there can be no absolute and complete separation of all the powers
of a practical government.”194 Because the Florida Constitution vests, then
limits, the entire power allocated to each branch, the text does not express
the exact parameters, scope, or details of each constituent authority
comprising such vested power.195 The power is absolute where no limitation
is expressed.196
The actual issue in Whiley was not whether the governor encroached on
the wholly, non-delegable legislative power to enact law. Rather, the issue
was whether under proper delegations of rulemaking authority already made
by the legislature, the governor had constitutional authority to supervise the
execution of rulemaking by at-will, appointed executive branch
subordinates.197 Rulemaking is a legislative function, delegable only with
sufficient guidelines and strictures to prevent the executive branch from
exercising unbridled discretion to make binding public policy or law.198 The
majority referred to these principles in their analysis:
Rulemaking is a derivative of lawmaking . . . . Accordingly,
‘[w]hen an agency promulgates a rule having the force of law, it
acts in place of the legislature’ . . . . Moreover, the Legislature has
delegated specific responsibilities to agency heads, such as the

192

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
193
State v. Johnson, 345 So. 2d 1069, 1071 (Fla. 1977).
194
State v. Atlantic Coast L. R. Co., 47 So. 969, 975 (Fla. 1908).
195
Whiley v. Scott, 79 So. 3d 702, 715 (Fla. 2011); Graham v. Haridopolos, 75 So. 3d
315, 318–19 (Fla. 2011); Sullivan v. Askew, 348 So. 2d 312, 315 (Fla. 1977); Corcoran v.
Geffen, 250 So. 3d 779, 783–84 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2018).
196
State ex rel. Kennedy v. Lee, 274 So. 2d 881, 882 (Fla. 1973), State ex rel. West v.
Butler, 69 So. 771, 777 (Fla. 1915).
197
Whiley v. Scott, 79 So. 3d 702, 717–18 (Fla. 2011) (Canady, C.J. dissenting).
198
See Sloban v. Fla. Bd. of Pharm., 982 So. 2d 26, 29–30 (Fla. 2008); Bd. of Trustees of
the Internal Improvement Trust Fund v. Day Cruise Ass’n, 794 So. 2d 696, 704 (Fla. 2001);
Southwest Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Save the Manatee Club, Inc., 773 So. 2d 594 (Fla. 2000).
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authority to determine whether to go forward with proposing,
amending, repealing, or adopting rules . . . . Accordingly, the
Legislature may specifically delegate, to some extent, its
rulemaking authority to the executive branch ‘to permit
administration of legislative policy by an agency with the
expertise and flexibility needed to deal with complex and fluid
conditions.’199
The majority concluded the suspension of rulemaking by EO 11-01,
applicable to those agencies headed by at-will gubernatorial appointees,
violated the APA.200 In reaching this conclusion, the majority determined
that the order made legally-binding changes to the rulemaking statutes, an
interpretation supported neither by facts in the record nor the order itself. If
the governor expressly attempted to unilaterally alter the statute, all seven
justices likely would have joined a single, succinct opinion upholding the
court’s established precedent. Under such circumstances, the court may have
easily found the governor had no authority to enter a binding order modifying
the law.201
Whether EO 11-72 actually superseded and replaced EO 11-01 was
insignificant to the majority.202 EO 11-72 continued to require that specific
agencies obtain OFARR review and approval prior to publishing any
rulemaking notice mandated by the APA.203
The majority concluded the directives in EO 11-01 and EO 11-72204
effectively altered the statute, usurping legislative power.205 As noted by
Justice Polston in his dissent, the APA is silent on the process applicable to
formulating policy prior to initiating statutory rulemaking, especially how,
when, where, and with whom an agency conducts such initial creation.206
The court agreed with the governor’s argument that the governor may
consult with agencies headed by his or her at-will appointees during this
period of formulation.207 Here, the only potential conflict between EO 11199

Whiley, 79 So. 3d at 710–11.
Id. at 713.
201
See, e.g., Fla. House of Representatives v. Crist, 999 So. 2d 601, 616 (Fla. 2008).
202
Whiley, 79 So. 3d at 719 (Polston, J., dissenting) (explaining that EO 11-72 by its own
terms “superseded” the earlier order, which overrode EO 11-01 and mooted any challenge to
it). Fla. Executive Order No. 2011-72, § 8 (Apr. 8, 2011) clearly states the order supersedes
EO 11-01. The phrasing used by the majority opinion seems to indicate that some retained
vitality in EO 11-01 was necessary for the case to continue.
203
Fla. Exec. Order No. 2011-72, supra note 115, § 1.
204
Fla. Exec. Order No. 2011-01, supra note 52, § 1; Fla. Exec. Order No. 2011-72, supra
note 115, § 1.
205
Whiley, 79 So. 3d at 713.
206
Id. at 721 (Polston, J., dissenting); see also Adam Smith Enters. v. State Dept. of
Envtl. Regulation, 553 So. 2d 1260, 1265 n. 4 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
207
Whiley, 79 So. 3d at 715–16; see also Oral Argument at 46:35, 57:15, 1:12:29–1:13:02,
Whiley v. Scott, 79 So. 3d 702 (Fla. 2011) (No. SC 11-592).
200
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01 and the APA was the direction for the Secretary of State not to publish
rulemaking notices without prior OFARR approval. Since the governor
cannot order anyone to act illegally without violating his or her own
constitutional duty to ensure faithful execution of the laws, that portion of
EO 11-01 was void ab initio, unless OFARR “directed” weekly publication
as required at that time.
The terms of both orders, the text of the APA, and the lack of any
sufficient facts on the record demonstrated the orders created no actual,
enforceable suspension of rulemaking in derogation of law. Nonetheless, the
court accepted Whiley’s errant view that agencies may hold and exercise
rulemaking authority independent from the direction or supervision of the
governor or any other elected constitutional officer.208 EO 11-01 suspended
prospective and pending rulemaking until the governor’s delegate could
review and approve the agency proposals.209 Moreover, EO 11-72 required
agencies under the direction of the governor to obtain OFARR approval
before commencing rulemaking and before publishing any rulemaking
notice as required by law.210 Neither order changed the APA requirements
for rulemaking, particularly with respect to the time limits for agencies to
act, rights of public access and petition, hearing rights, or any other provision
mandated by law to provide the public access and input. The orders only
affected communications between the governor and at-will gubernatorial
appointees and imposed no binding requirements on the state as a whole or
any citizen.
The only issue was Whiley’s policy objection to the OFARR process
for reviewing pending or proposed rules—there was no violation of the APA.
Both orders left intact the legal remedies to compel compliance by state
officers with statutory rulemaking requirements. By choosing an internal
review process requiring consideration by his staff, the governor merely
created additional time pressure on his office because the full requirements
of the APA still applied. As noted by Justice Polston’s questioning at oral
argument, if the orders changed the statutory rulemaking requirements, the
governor would have exceeded his powers because he cannot change the law
unilaterally. Thus, with the promulgation of EO 11-72, the governor
remained within the scope of constitutional executive authority and did not
encroach on the legislative power.
B. The Majority Improperly Interpreted Article IV
The majority relied on strained interpretations of the constitutional
208
See Petition for Writ of Quo Warranto, supra note 4, at 11–12; Petitioner’s Amended
Reply, supra note 102, at 17–19, 34.
209
Fla. Exec. Order No. 2011-01, supra note 52, §§ 1, 4.
210
Fla. Exec. Order No. 2011-72, supra note 115, § 1.
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doctrines of separation of powers and the vesting of executive power, as well
as of the APA. The opinion approved the rationale of AGO 81-49 and found
the APA made an agency head responsible for that agency’s rulemaking,
exclusive of any supervision and direction by the governor and regardless of
the nature of the appointment.211 The majority concluded the appointee was
intended to exercise rulemaking authority independent of the governor’s
preferences, because the legislature placed an agency under the direct
supervision of a non-elected at-will gubernatorial appointee, but did not
expressly empower the governor to supervise or direct the actions of that
official.212 The majority’s analysis conflicted with interpretations and
applications of article IV in the Florida Constitution by prior governors, and
deviated from the court’s previously articulated principles of constitutional
interpretation.
1. Principles for Interpreting the Florida Constitution
In Florida jurisprudence, the primary purpose of constitutional
construction is to discern and effectuate the intent and objective of the
people.213 Interpretation begins with the specific constitutional provision’s
text; if the language is clear, use of other interpretive means is
unnecessary.214 Every part of the Constitution must be construed together
and given its full effect, particularly if there are multiple provisions on the
same subject.215 No word or part may be considered mere surplusage.216
While interpretation relies on the plain and ordinary meaning of the words
used in each provision, the construction adopted for one section must not
oppose the clear intention of another.217 If the language of a provision is
unclear or subject to more than one reasonable meaning, a court must apply
additional interpretive principles (the “rules of interpretation”) to construe
211

Whiley, 79 So. 3d at 714–15.
Id. at 715–16 .
213
Browning v. Fla. Hometown Democracy, Inc., 29 So. 3d 1053, 1063 (Fla. 2010);
Caribbean Conservation Corp. v. Fla. Fish & Wildlife Conservation Comm’n, 838 So. 2d 492,
501 (Fla. 2003); Metro. Dade County v. City of Miami, 396 So. 2d 144, 146 (Fla. 1980); St.
Petersburg v. Briley, Wild & Associates, Inc., 239 So. 2d 817, 821–22 (Fla. 1970).
214
Benjamin v. Tandem Healthcare, Inc., 998 So. 2d 566, 570 (Fla. 2008); St. Petersburg
v. Briley, Wild & Associates, Inc., 239 So. 2d 817, 821–22 (Fla. 1970); State ex rel West v.
Gray, 74 So. 2d 114, 116 (Fla. 1954); Gray v. Bryant, 125 So. 2d 846, 862 (Fla. 1960)
(Thornal, J., concurring) (“[i]t is unnecessary to apply rules of construction to arrive at the
meaning of a constitutional provision when the language of the Constitution is clear and
explicit.”).
215
Advisory Op. to the Governor, 706 So. 2d 278, 281 (Fla. 1997); Plante v. Smathers,
372 So. 2d 933, 936 (Fla. 1979); Gray v. Bryant, 125 So. 2d 846, 852 (Fla. 1960).
216
Advisory Op. to the Governor, 706 So. 2d at 281; Plante, 372 So. 2d at 936; Gray,
125 So. 2d at 852.
217
Benjamin v. Tandem Healthcare, Inc., 998 So. 2d 566, 570 (Fla. 2008); Advisory Op.
to the Governor, 706 So. 2d at 281; Gray, 125 So. 2d at 858.
212
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the Constitution, consistent with the intent of the people in adopting the
instrument.218 The court stated, “[w]here the words admit of two senses,
each of which is conformable to common usage, that sense is to be adopted
which, without departing from the literal import of the words, best
harmonizes with the nature and objects, the scope and design, of the
instrument.”219 While the rules of statutory interpretation generally apply,
constitutional construction requires greater flexibility by emphasizing the
principles of the provision as adopted by the people over strict adherence to
the literal meaning of the chosen words.220 Finally, the Constitution may not
be interpreted in a manner leading to an irrational or absurd result.221
2. The Majority’s Alternate Interpretation of Article IV
The majority opinion created an alternate view of article IV, sections
1(a) and 6, that conflicted with previous interpretations and applications of
the scope of executive power vested by the Florida Constitution. Established
principles of interpretation should have compelled the majority to utilize the
tools of construction to determine the full intent of the people in adopting
sections 1(a) and 6. The governor relied on the constitutional text, the court’s
prior decisions, and the actions of his predecessors to argue the historicallyaccepted interpretation of the vested executive power.222 The governor has
sufficient constitutional authority to direct and supervise his at-will
appointed subordinates, including authority to direct the formulation and
implementation of policy through the rulemaking of agencies directed by
such appointees.223
The majority, however, adopted a contrary
interpretation—the governor’s executive power did not extend to appointed
agency heads because the APA purportedly placed the exercise of delegated
rulemaking authority by these officers outside his control.224
This conclusion conflicted with the court’s prior interpretation of the
interaction between article IV, sections 1(a) and 6, and the organization of
the executive branch agencies under Florida Statutes, Chapter 20. In Jones
v. Chiles, a compensation claims judge petitioned the court for a writ of
mandamus ordering Governor Chiles to reappoint the judge for another four-

218

Briley, Wild & Associates, Inc., 239 So. 2d at 822; State ex rel West, 74 So. 2d at 116.
State ex rel West, 74 So. 2d at 116 (quoting JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 633 (5th ed., 1905)).
220
Coastal Fla. Police Benevolent Ass’n v. Williams, 838 So. 2d 543, 548 (Fla. 2003).
221
Agency for Health Care Admin. v. Associated Indus. 678 So. 2d 1239, 1247 (Fla.
1996); Plante, 372 So. 2d at 936 (citing City of Miami v. Romfh, 63 So. 440 (1913)).
222
Response to Petition for Writ of Quo Warranto, supra note 121, at 32–34, 38–44.
223
Response to Petition for Writ of Quo Warranto, supra note 121, at 26–27, 30–54.
224
Whiley v. Scott, 79 So. 3d 702, 715 (Fla. 2011). See, FLA. STAT. §§ 120.54(3)(a)1,
120.54(3)(e)1 (2010).
219
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year term.225 The relevant statute required a statewide nominating
commission to consider the reappointment of all compensation claims judges
prior to the expiration of their respective terms.226 If the commission
recommended retention, the statute required the governor to reappoint the
judge for another four-year term.227 If the commission declined retention,
the governor could not reappoint the judge.228 Concerning the judge, the
commission recommended retention but the governor refused
reappointment.229 The judge argued reappointment was merely a ministerial
task once the commission approved retention, and the governor had no
discretion to refuse.230 The governor argued the statute violated the
separation of powers by depriving him of his gubernatorial prerogative to
appoint executive branch officers.231
The Florida Supreme Court noted that these compensation claims
judges served under a department of the executive branch headed by a
secretary appointed by and serving at the pleasure of the governor.232 After
examining article IV, sections 1(a) and 6 as well as the statute, the court
concluded that because the head of the agency was an at-will gubernatorial
appointee, the direct authority to appoint compensation claims judges could
be placed only in the governor or the department secretary.233 If placed with
the Secretary, the exercise of that authority remained subject to the
governor’s constitutional power to direct and supervise the Secretary.234
In Jones v. Chiles, the Court expressly interpreted the consequences of
denominating an at-will gubernatorial appointee as the head of an
administrative entity and recognized that the secretary exercised the
authority delegated by statute, subject to the continuing oversight and
direction of the governor.235 In Whiley, the governor argued the holding from
225

Jones v. Chiles, 638 So. 2d 48 (Fla. 1994); see FLA. STAT. § 440.45 (2016) (the Office
of the Judges of Compensation Claims is created by statute, not the Florida Constitution).
226
FLA. STAT. § 440.45 (1991).
227
Jones, 638 So. 2d at 48–49 (citing FLA. STAT. § 440.45 (1991)).
228
Jones, 638 So. 2d at 48–49 (citing FLA. STAT. § 440.45 (1991)). As noted by the court,
during the pendency of the case, the legislature amended the statute to eliminate this power
of the commission and place the power of reappointment solely in the Governor. See also id.
at 52 n.3 (citing 1993 Fla. Laws 415).
229
Id. at 48–49.
230
Id. at 50.
231
Id.
232
Jones, 638 So. 2d at 50. At that time the Judges of Compensation Claims were under
the Department of Labor and Employment Security. See FLA. STAT. § 20.171 (1991), which
was repealed by 2002 Fla. Laws 194, § 69. The Office of the Judges of Compensation Claims
previously was placed under the director of the Division of Administrative Hearings. See 2001
Fla. Laws 91.
233
Id.
234
Id.
235
The APA definition of “agency head” in effect during 1991 was identical to the
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Chiles for this very point.236 In contrast, Whiley’s counsel only referenced
the case as an example of legislative encroachment into the executive power.
Whiley did not comment on the court’s express construction in Chiles of
article IV, sections 1(a) and 6, that effectively validated the governor’s
authority to direct and supervise at-will agency head appointees.237
Interestingly, the Whiley majority did not even address Jones v. Chiles and
its interpretation of article IV, sections 1(a) and 6. Instead, the majority
constructed and applied a contrary and novel interpretation of the same
constitutional language, ruling that the legislative designation of an at-will
appointee as an agency head precluded the governor from directing or
supervising that official’s exercise of delegated power.238 Contrast the
majority rationale in Whiley discussing the impact of article IV, sections 1(a)
and 6, on statutory delegations of authority to agency heads with the
conclusion on that issue in Jones v. Chiles:
As the chief executive officer in whom the supreme executive
power is vested, (FN1. See art. IV, § 1(a), Fla. Const.) the
Governor has direct supervision over all executive departments
unless the legislature places that supervision in the hands of one
of the following other executive officers: the lieutenant governor,
the governor and cabinet, a cabinet member, or an officer or board
appointed by and serving at the pleasure of the governor. See art.
IV, §§ 1(a), 6, Fla. Const. Inherent in that direct supervisory
authority is the power to appoint executive officers to public
office . . . .
Under section 20.171, the Department of Labor and Employment
Security comes under the direct supervision of the Secretary of
Labor and Employment Security, an officer who is appointed by
and serves at the pleasure of the Governor. As such, only the
Governor or the Secretary of Labor and Employment Security,
subject to the Governor’s approval, would have the power to
appoint judges of compensation claims.239
By not overruling Jones v. Chiles, the Whiley majority effectively
created a second “reasonable” interpretation of article IV, sections 1(a) and
6, compelling use of the full tools of constitutional interpretation: “[t]o

statutory definition in place when the Governor promulgated EO 11-01. Compare FLA. STAT.
§ 120.52(3) (2011), with FLA. STAT. § 120.52(3) (1991) (the language in both sections is the
same: ‘“[a]gency head’ means the person or collegial body in a department or other
governmental unit statutorily responsible for final agency action.”).
236
Whiley v. Scott, 79 So. 3d 702, 715 (Fla. 2011).
237
Petitioner’s Amended Reply to Respondent’s Response to Petition for Writ of Quo
Warranto and Amicus Brief of the Attorney General at 5, Whiley v. Scott, 79 So. 3d 702 (Fla.
2011) (No. SC 11-592).
238
Whiley, 79 So. 3d at 713–15.
239
Jones, 638 So. 2d at 50.

MILLER (DO NOT DELETE)

34

SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL

1/16/2019 11:09 AM

[Vol. 43:1

prevent an interpretation of this language which would lead to an
unreasonable conclusion, or to one such as was not intended by the framers,
we are privileged to look to the historical background of this particular
provision.”240 Although the majority acknowledged the need for further
interpretation by delving into the historical record of prior actions by Florida
governors directing and supervising agency rulemaking, the constrained
scope of this attempt failed to answer two key questions. First, what was the
legislature’s intent in framing, and the people in adopting, article IV, sections
1(a) and 6, in the 1968 Constitution? Second, how should article IV, sections
1(a) and 6, be construed together to give full effect to each section?
3. Historical Guidance: Past Practices of Governors
How should the Whiley majority have considered the practices of prior
governors in directing and supervising rulemaking by administrative
agencies? Four different governors directed the rulemaking of agencies
headed by at-will appointees to conform to express policy decisions.241
Governor Scott argued these precedents demonstrated his predecessors’
historical understanding that the constitutional executive power authorized
his continued direction and supervision of agencies headed by at-will
gubernatorial appointees.242 The majority dismissed the governor’s reliance
by opining that Governor Chiles’ Executive Orders 95-74 and 95-256 were
“clearly limited to review of agency rules,” a conclusion contrary to the
actual text of these orders.243
EO 95-74, section 1, required each agency to review its rules
thoroughly but then directed each agency “to proceed immediately to repeal
obsolete rules” identified by such review.244 EO 95-256 reiterated the
requirement for a thorough review and report of existing agency rules and
mandated implementation of express policy pertaining to rulemaking.245 The
order directed agencies “to take immediate steps to repeal rules, to carry out
Executive Order 95-74.”246 The order further directed agencies to begin
rulemaking proceedings to “overhaul, amend, or repeal” the rules identified
for such treatment in their respective reports.247 The order created “The Rule
240

St Petersburg v. Briley, Wild & Associates, Inc., 239 So. 2d 817, 822 (Fla. 1970).
Miller, Direction and Supervision, supra note 17, at 349–51.
242
Response to Petition for Writ of Quo Warranto, supra note 121, at 41–44.
243
Whiley, 79 So. 3d at 712.
244
Fla. Exec. Order No. 1995-74 (February 27, 1995); see also Stephen T. Maher, The
Death of Rules: How Politics is Suffocating Florida, 8 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 313, 321–24
(1996).
245
Fla. Exec. Order No. 1995-256 (July 12, 1995); see also Maher, supra note 244, at
324–328.
246
Id. at § 1.
247
Id. at § 3.
241
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of Flexibility”—Governor Chiles’ express statement of policy guiding
agency decisions to implement or interpret controlling statutes by ruleand
mandated the agencies conduct all rulemaking according to this principle.248
The order was “directed to the Governor’s agencies.”249
The Whiley majority thought the critical difference between the 1995
and 2011 orders was that, under the 1995 order, the agencies “remained free
to engage in the proposal, amendment, and repeal of rules without approval
from a member of the Executive Office of the Governor.”250 This distinction
is without difference. In 1995, Governor Chiles directly ordered how each
“Governor’s agency” (those headed by appointees serving at his pleasure)
was to proceed with particular types of rulemaking and what overarching
policy to apply.251 In 2011, Governor Scott directed how similar agency
heads were to approach particular rulemaking decisions.252 In both cases,
the governor supervised and directed specific rulemaking actions and
activities. Governor Scott delegated the receipt, review, and notification
function to a designee in his office, while Governor Chiles imposed just as
significant restrictions on agency policy action, without requiring an
intermediate step.253
Governors Graham, Martinez, and Crist directed similar unequivocal
rulemaking mandates to administrative agencies.254 The common practice
among these governors, with different political agendas and policy
preferences, belies the majority’s espoused narrow view.
4. Historical Guidance: Crafting Article IV, Section 6
What was the intent of the legislature in framing, and the people in
adopting, article IV, sections 1(a) and 6 as part of the 1968 Constitution? In
a prior analysis of a constitutional provision requiring resort to extrinsic
methods of construction to determine its reasonable meaning and the
framers’ intent, the court studiously considered the textual development in
the 1966 study commission and the legislature of 1967 thru 1968.255 The
1966 study commission expressly debated and partly rejected legislative
control of the governor’s authority over the executive branch agencies
248

Id. at 4.
Id. at § 8.
250
Whiley v. Scott, 79 So. 3d 702, 713 (Fla. 2011).
251
Fla. Exec. Order No. 1995-256, supra note 245, §§ 2, 3, 4.
252
Fla. Exec. Order No. 2011-01, supra note 52, §§ 1, 4, 5; Fla. Exec. Order No. 201172, supra note 115, §§ 1, 6.
253
Fla. Exec. Order No. 1995-256, supra note 245, §§ 1, 4, 8.
254
See Fla. Exec. Order No. 1981-74 ( July 2, 1981); Fla. Exec. Order No. 1981-105 (
Sept. 4, 1981); Fla. Exec. Order No. 1989-01 (Jan. 5, 1989); Fla. Exec. Order No. 2007-127
(July 13, 2007). See also, Miller, Direction and Supervision, supra note 17, at 349–51.
255
St. Petersburg v. Briley, Wild & Associates, Inc., 239 So. 2d 817, 822 (Fla. 1970).
249
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resulting from the new reorganization.256 During its consideration and
drafting of article IV, the legislature went further and struck all text
providing for legislative control over the elected officials’ authority to direct
and supervise subordinate executive officials.257
This extensive
consideration and rejection of legislative control conclusively shows the
intent of the framers when drafting article IV, section 6, and of the people
when they adopted the 1968 Constitution, which directly contravened the
majority’s conclusion. By authorizing the legislature to place agencies under
the direct supervision of non-elected, at-will appointees, the people intended
neither to authorize the apportionment of executive authority to subordinates
independent from the governor nor divest the governor’s authority and
responsibility for their actions.
5. Integrated Construction of Article IV, Giving Each Section
Full Effect
How should article IV, sections 1(a) and 6, be construed to give full
effect to each section? The current Florida Constitution vests the executive
power of the people, divided among particular officials, under limitations
deemed necessary to preserve individual liberty, just as each executive
article in every prior version of the Constitution.258 The majority failed to
address the significance of readopting the same language used since 1845 to
describe the governor’s power and the necessity of understanding that
language in its proper historical context. Nor did the majority consider the
importance of the development of present article IV, section 6, in the 1966
study commission and in the legislature, which led to a section solely
purposed with reorganizing the executive branch.259 After 1968, and until
2011, the three branches of Florida government applied the newly-adopted
text in article IV, section 6 in a manner consistent with the historical
interpretation of section 1(a).260
The majority misapplied a basic rule of construction by reading the text
of article IV, section 6, as implying legislative authority to create appointed
agency heads with the ability to exercise executive power independent from
the governor.261 This reading conflicted with the clear text of section 6 and
the legislature’s historical understanding of the constitutional authority to
create and empower administrative departments. Interpreting the text as
256

Miller, Historical Development, supra note 17, at 407–10.
Id. at 410–13.
258
See FLA. CONST. art. III (1838); FLA. CONST. art. III (1861); FLA. CONST. art. V (1868)
(amended 1871); FLA. CONST. art. IV (1885); FLA. CONST. art. IV (1968) (amended 1998).
259
Miller, Historical Development, supra note 17, at 410–15.
260
Miller, Direction and Supervision, supra note 17, at 341–43, 345–54.
261
Whiley v. Scott, 79 So. 3d 702, 714 (Fla. 2011). See section IV.B.1, for the discussion
of constitutional interpretive principles in section IV.B.1 of this article.
257
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implying some authority to create independently-acting, appointed agency
heads also conflicts with the framers’ use of express language to restrict the
power vested in the governor. Those express constitutional provisions
constraining the governor place certain portions of executive power under
separate authorities. Accordingly, the legislature may affect the allocation
of executive power only when expressly authorized in the Constitution. One
example is the scope of authority for the Commissioner of Agriculture, who
is elected directly by the people and has “supervision of all matters pertaining
to agriculture,” unless the legislature provides otherwise by law.262 Article
IV, section 6, authorizes the legislature to reorganize the executive branch
and determine which official (or officials) would directly administer the
operations of each department; it does not authorize the legislature to limit
or expand a given official’s scope of authority relative to the governor’s
vested powers.263
The majority’s analysis failed to give full effect to the intent of the
framers in proposing, and the people in adopting, article IV, section 6. In
developing and proposing section 6, the legislature expressly considered and
rejected the authority to enable those agency heads appointed by and serving
at the pleasure of the governor to exercise their authority, without the
governor’s direction and supervision.264 As shown by the final text, the
purpose of section 6 was to ensure that elected constitutional executives
(principally the governor) retained authority and responsibility for
supervising and controlling the actions of the executive departments.265 This
purpose is discerned by construing together and giving effect to all
provisions of article IV, beyond the majority’s unduly-narrow reading
limited to section 6.266
Reliance on AGO 81-49 disserved the majority’s construction of article
IV. The attorney general is authorized by statute to issue official opinions to
a limited range of state executive officers, members of the legislature, and
certain local officials.267 The courts carefully consider these opinions, which
are regarded as highly persuasive when addressing the particular legal

262

FLA. CONST. art. IV. § 4(d).
Id. at § 6 (“All functions of the executive branch of state government shall be allotted
among not more than twenty-five departments, exclusive of those specifically provided for or
authorized in this constitution. The administration of each department, unless otherwise
provided in this constitution, shall be placed by law under the direct supervision of the
governor, the lieutenant governor, the governor and cabinet, a cabinet member, or an officer
or board appointed by and serving at the pleasure of the governor . . . . “).
264
Miller, Historical Development, supra note 17, at 410–413.
265
FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 6.
266
See Advisory Op. to the Governor, 706 So. 2d 278, 281 (Fla. 1997); Plante v.
Smathers, 372 So. 2d 933, 936 (Fla. 1979); Gray v. Bryant, 125 So. 2d 846, 852 (Fla. 1960).
267
FLA. STAT. § 16.01(3) (2018).
263
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issue.268 State and local officers may rely on an opinion in performing their
official duties, unless and until that opinion is superseded by a judicial
decision.269 Above all, attorney general opinions are not binding on the
courts, a point expressly noted by the Whiley majority.270 Unlike a contested
case, the attorney general issues an opinion on the representation of facts
presented in the petition, not by a weighing of evidence; nor does the attorney
general have the benefit of a complete analysis of the legal issues by
opposing advocates. Particularly, as in Whiley, where the attorney general
expressly advocated against the continuing viability of AGO 81-49,
opposition by the very office that issued the opinion should have made the
court reluctant to apply its reasoning without establishing that this reasoning
was reliable.271 This is noteworthy because the conclusion of AGO 81-49
conflicted with the interpretation by the court in Jones v. Chiles.
AGO 81-49 misinterpreted the legislature’s power to determine which
officer should administer an agency as authority to dispossess the governor’s
ability to direct or supervise the actions of that agency.272 The attorney
general opinion discussed the duty of the governor to ensure faithful
execution of the laws, but it did not analyze the interrelationship between
vesting supreme executive power in section 1(a) and allotting direct
supervision for an agency’s daily actions under section 6.273 The conclusion
of AGO 81-49 ignored the impact and consequences of article IV, section
1(a), by treating the vesting of “supreme executive power” as mere
surplusage, and narrowly focusing only on section 6. Properly applying the
rules of constitutional interpretation to the full text of article IV yields
precisely the opposite result.
The majority fell into the same interpretive trap as the author of AGO
81-49. The Whiley dissenters, particularly Chief Justice Canady, stressed the
significance of construing together the full text of articles IV, sections 1(a)
and 6.274 The Chief Justice succinctly framed the interpretive principles and
issues in the case. He articulated both the source of the governor’s authority
and that the governor acted within his constitutional power to direct agency
rulemaking by at-will appointees.275 The majority’s response was less than
clarifying:
268
State v. Family Bank of Hallandale, 623 So. 2d 474, 478 (Fla. 1993); Beverly v. Div.
of Beverage of Dep’t of Bus. Reg., 282 So. 2d 657, 660 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
269
Family Bank of Hallandale, 623 So. 2d at 478 (citing State ex rel. Atl. Coast Line R.
Co. v. State Bd. of Equalizers, 94 So. 681 (1922)).
270
Id. at 478; Beverly, 282 So. 2d at 660; Whiley v. Scott, 79 So. 3d 702, 714 (Fla. 2011).
271
Amicus Brief of the Attorney General, supra note 35, at 15–17.
272
Miller, Direction and Supervision, supra note 17, at 354–57.
273
AGO 81-49, at 1–2. See FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 1(a).
274
Whiley, 79 So. 3d at 717–18 (Canady, C.J., dissenting).
275
Id.
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With apparent disregard for the Court’s precedent, the dissents
deem the Governor all-powerful as “the supreme executive
power” by virtue of article IV, section 1(a) of the Florida
Constitution . . . . The phrase “supreme executive power” is not
so expansive, however, and to grant such a reading ignores the
fundamental principle that our state constitution is a limitation
upon, rather than a grant of, power . . . . Moreover, the dissents’
failure to address the provisions of the APA delegating to agency
heads the authority to determine whether to go forward with
proposing, amending, repealing, or adopting rules—i.e., sections
120.54(3)(a)(1) and 120.54(3)(e)(1), Florida Statutes (2010)—an
authority that cannot be delegated by any entity other than the
Legislature, demonstrates the absence of support for the position
advanced.276
Three interpretive errors readily appear in this statement. First, the
majority failed to give full meaning to all of the text in article IV, sections
1(a) and 6. Contrary to the plain language of article IV, the intent of its
framers, and the history of Florida’s constitutional executive article, the
majority treated the phrase “supreme executive power” as insubstantial
surplusage and disregarded its proper use in the construction of section 6.
Here, the majority apparently accepted Whiley’s assertions at face value and
failed to take into account the governor’s repeated acknowledgement of the
constitutional constraints on his authority as well as statutory requirements.
No attempt was made by the majority to distinguish their reading of the term
from the usage and understanding applied by the dissents or to explain why
the phrase did not substantially affect the interpretation of section 6. Nothing
in the dissenting opinions showed an obsequious application rendering the
governor “all powerful;” indeed, both the Chief Justice and Justice Polston
stressed the constitutional limitations of the governor’s authority.
Second, the majority failed to discern the proper use of “supreme
executive power” as a hierarchical statement of the governor’s powers and
duties. The majority did not broadly interpret the phrase to make the
governor all-powerful (a point which the dissenters and the governor
agreed). The majority then attempted to refute this fabricated argument by
emphasizing that the Constitution is a limitation of power.277 The majority
did not explain what power, precisely, is limited by vesting the “supreme
executive power” in the governor. The full text of article IV limits the
executive power, but the vesting of executive power identified as “supreme”
shows that the people intended a hierarchical structure for the executive
276

Id. at 715 (internal citations omitted). The majority cites no precedent for this
statement other than tangential references to cases stating the standard principle that the
Florida Constitution is a document limiting, not granting, power.
277
Id.
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branch—one where the governor has full authority and responsibility unless
otherwise directed by the express terms of the article.278
Third, the majority construed statutory delegations of responsibility to
agency heads for certain rulemaking procedural steps as impliedly limiting
the governor’s constitutional executive power. Having fabricated and
dismissed the argument that “supreme executive power” should be
interpreted as making the governor all-powerful, the majority then criticized
the dissenting justices for not discussing the impact of legislative actions
such as the APA on the governor’s authority as limited by article IV, section
1(a).279 The majority concluded that the “supreme executive power” of the
governor could be limited by the APA’s requirements for rulemaking, but
failed to explain how the legislature could delegate rulemaking authority to
the executive branch without making the execution of that authority subject
to the vested constitutional executive power. The obvious problem with this
analysis is that if the governor’s supervisory authority is rooted in the
“limitation” of supreme executive power articulated in section 1(a), it is a
constitutional power outside of the APA; thus, APA delegations to agency
heads cannot restrict the executive power vested in the governor.280
Article IV, section 6, does not authorize the legislature to insulate
administrative agencies from the supervisory powers of the governor,
particularly when the agency head serves at the pleasure of the governor.281
The Constitution expressly constrains the role of the legislature to allocate
executive functions among a limited number of departments and to assign
the administration of each agency to the direct supervision of a specificallydenominated official.282 The legislature has no authority to create an
unlimited number of officials independent from the governor or to create
new forms of executive power. Reasonably harmonized, article IV, sections
1(a) and (6), clearly show that the intent of the framers and the people was
not only to reorganize the executive branch agencies, but also to ensure
subordination of all executive officers to those constitutional officers
answerable to voters.
278

See, e.g., Miller, Historical Development, supra note 17.
Whiley, 79 So. 3d at 715.
280
FLA. STAT. § 120.52(1)(a) (2018) (‘“Agency’ means the following officers or
governmental entities if acting pursuant to powers other than those derived from the
constitution . . . . The Governor; each state officer and state department, and each
departmental unit described in s. 20.04 . . . .”).
281
FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 6.
282
Id. As stated in the text of FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 6, the legislature by law may allot
executive functions among a limited number of departments and may provide whether a
department is supervised directly by the governor, one or more of the other constitutional
officers, or by one or more individuals appointed by and serving at the pleasure of the
governor. The text provides that the governor’s appointing power may be limited by requiring
senate confirmation or approval by three members of the cabinet.
279
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The majority discounted the impact of the governor’s authority to
remove appointed agency heads serving at his pleasure on whether article
IV, sections 1(a) and 6, acted to provide the governor with continuing
authority to direct and supervise administrative rulemaking by such
officials.283 Because the APA does not expressly delegate authority to the
governor to direct and supervise agency heads, the majority implied that the
governor is excluded from any other role in agency rulemaking, a finding
contrary to the scope of power vested and described in a full reading of
sections 1(a) and (6). The majority conflated Florida Statutes, section
120.54(1)(k), with article IV, section 6, to imply that the legislature created
at-will appointed agency heads empowered to act independently from the
governor’s direction and supervision. The majority dismissed the dissents’
interpretation that the statute was designed simply to bar delegations by the
agency head to agency subordinates so that agency rulemaking would
proceed only with the knowledge, and accountability, of the agency head.
But, the agency head’s retention of official responsibility for rulemaking is
exactly what the law required, and no more:
An agency head may delegate the authority to initiate rule
development under subsection (2); however, rulemaking
responsibilities of an agency head under subparagraph (3)(a)1.,
subparagraph (3)(e)1., or subparagraph (3)(e)6. may not be
delegated or transferred.284
The ordinary and plain meaning of “delegate” is to entrust part of one’s
work, power, authority, or responsibility to be done by another, such as a
subordinate.285
The “authority” under Florida Statutes, sections
120.54(3)(a)1 and 120.54(3)(e)1, is a check on rulemaking: the agency may
not publish a notice of a proposed rule or file a rule for final adoption without
the approval of the actual agency head. The wording and structure of Florida
Statutes, section 120.54(1)(k), shows that the legislature clearly only
intended that the agency head could not delegate these specific tasks; the
statute cannot be extrapolated to bar the governor from directing and
supervising his appointees. If the legislature intended such a reading, it
certainly knew how to enact words preventing any third party from directing,
supervising, influencing, or otherwise asserting authority over any agency
head in exercising delegated rulemaking authority.
The majority’s analytical error presumed that where the legislature
assigns responsibility to an agency without expressly providing for
gubernatorial supervision, the legislature disables the governor from
283

Whiley, 79 So. 3d at 715.
FLA. STAT. § 120.54(1)(k) (2018).
285
Delegate,
OXFORD
ONLINE
http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/delegate (last visited Dec. 19, 2018).
284

DICTIONARY,
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supervising the activity. The reality is precisely the opposite: if the
legislature intends to remove a subordinate from direct accountability to that
official’s immediate superior, it does so through express legislation.286 In
supervising agency heads, where the legislature may act but chooses not to
do so, the governor retains presumptive authority to direct the actions of
those serving at the governor’s pleasure.
6. The Importance of Article IV, Section 1(a) as a SelfExecuting Provision
The Florida Constitution itself vests the supreme executive power in
the governor; the clause is self-executing, requiring no further action for its
implementation or completion.287 This means the Constitution fully vested
the governor with the supreme executive power before the legislature
reorganized the executive branch and created Florida Statutes, Chapter 20.
In construing article IV, sections 1(a) and 6, in pari materia, every statutory
allocation of departmental administration to an at-will gubernatorial
appointee remained subject to the supreme power vested and existing in the
governor at the time the statute was enacted. The subsequent adoption of
rulemaking procedures in the APA in 1974, including the definition of
“agency head,” was subject to both the vested authority of the governor and
the existing allotment of administrative supervision.288 Because the framers
of the Constitution expressly rejected legislative control over the scope of
executive power to direct and supervise administrative agencies, and because
the authority in article IV, section 6, is limited to allotting supervision of
agency administration, the power already vested in the governor provided
full authority to direct and supervise at-will appointed agency heads absent
constitutionally-valid, express language.289

286

See Agency for Health Care Admin. v. Associated Indus. of Fla., 678 So. 2d 1239,
1248 (Fla. 1996).
287
See Fla. Dep’t of Educ. v. Glasser, 622 So. 2d 944, 947 (Fla. 1993) (“Had the framers
of the 1968 Florida Constitution intended a self-executing grant of power, they could have
chosen self-executing language. Our present constitution contains numerous examples of such
phrases . . . . ‘The supreme executive power shall be vested in a governor.’”) (quoting FLA.
CONST. art. IV, § 1(a)); see also Gray v. Bryant, 125 So. 2d 846, 851 (Fla. 1960) (“The basic
guide, or test, in determining whether a constitutional provision should be construed to be
self-executing, or not self-executing, is whether or not the provision lays down a sufficient
rule by means of which the right or purpose which it gives or is intended to accomplish may
be determined, enjoyed, or protected without the aid of legislative enactment. If the provision
lays down a sufficient rule, it speaks for the entire people and is self-executing.”) (citing State
ex rel. City of Fulton v. Smith, 194 S.W.2d 302 (Mo. 1946); City of Shawnee v. Williamson,
338 P.2d 355 (Okla. 1959)). FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 1(a).
288
See FLA. CONST. art. IV, §§ 1(a), 6; FLA. STAT. §§ 20.02–05 (1973).
289
See Fla. Exec. Order No. 1995-256, § 4, supra note 245 (quoting in part FLA. CONST.
art. IV, § 6); Miller, Historical Development, supra note 17, at 410–413.
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7. No Absurd Result
No matter how novel the proposed analysis or esoteric the argument,
properly interpreting the Florida Constitution requires a pragmatic approach:
“‘[t]he Constitution is concerned with substance and not with form and its
framers did not intend to forbid a common-sense application of its
provisions.’”290 An interpretation leading to an absurd result must be
rejected if the provision may be interpreted differently to accomplish the
intent of the people.291 Courts must avoid interpretations leading to
unreasonable or absurd consequences that the people did not intend.292
Plainly defined, an interpretation is “absurd” if it is ridiculously
unreasonable or lacks a rational or orderly relationship to human reality.293
The majority rejected the concept that the power to remove at-will
gubernatorial appointees exemplified the authority to direct and supervise
those officials in the exercise of delegated rulemaking authority.294 The
justices inverted a line from the governor’s argument, declaring “the power
to remove is not analogous to the power to control.”295 This interpretation is
counterintuitive to the understanding of basic human nature that the federal
and state executives, legislators, courts, and commentators articulate.296 The
Congressional debates over executive power, and the recurring reservations
about the impact on an independent judiciary of the legislative power of
appropriation, point to a consensus conclusion diametrically opposed to that
of the Whiley majority: the delegated power to direct the actions and control
the exercise of governmental authority directly flows from the power to
290

See State ex rel. West v. Gray, 74 So. 2d 114, 118 (Fla. 1954) (approving Meredith v.
Kauffman, 169 S.W.2d 37, 38 (Ky. 1943) (emphasis in original).
291
Plante v. Smathers, 372 So. 2d 933, 936 (Fla. 1979) (citing Miami v. Romfh, 63 So.
440 (Fla. 1913)).
292
St. Petersburg v. Briley, Wild & Associates, Inc., 239 So. 2d 817, 822 (Fla. 1970)
(citing Florida Dry Cleaning & Laundry Bd. v. Everglades Laundry, Inc., 188 So. 380 (Fla.
1939)).
293
Absurd,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER
ONLINE
DICTIONARY,
http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/absurd (last visited Dec. 19, 2018).
294
Construing both FLA. CONST. art. IV, §§ 1(a) and 6, the power to remove at-will
employees arises under the broad mandate of authority to the governor in § 1(a).
295
Whiley v. Scott, 79 So. 3d 702, 715 (Fla. 2011).
296
State ex rel. Albritton v. Lee, 183 So. 782, 790 (Fla. 1938) (Ellis, C.J., concurring)
(quoting 1 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW, 281 (O. Holmes ed., 12th ed. 1873)
(“In his excellent work, Commentaries on American Law, which has been recognized since
1826 as containing a clear and correct elucidation of the fundamental principles of the
American governmental system, Honorable James Kent expresses the thought in the
following words: ‘It would be in vain to declare that the different departments of government
should be kept separate and distinct, while the legislature possessed a discretionary control
over the salaries of the executive and judicial officers. This would be to disregard the voice
of experience and the operation of invariable principles of human conduct. A control over a
man’s living is, in most cases, a control over his actions.’”); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 70
(Alexander Hamilton).
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remove such at will officers because of the control over subordinates’
livelihood. The majority’s conclusion runs counter to basic observations
about human nature reflected and incorporated into the fabric of both the
U.S. and Florida Constitutions.
8. The People’s Intent
The U.S. Supreme Court noted that although the Constitution gives
Congress the power to restrict presidential control of appointees, such power
has its inherent limits: “(i)n its pursuit of a ‘workable government,’ Congress
cannot reduce the Chief Magistrate to a cajoler-in-chief.”297 This observation
succinctly summarizes the clear intent of the people in adopting the 1968
Florida Constitution: to provide the governor with full authority and
responsibility for the exercise of executive power, excluding only that which
is vested in other elected officials, subject to express constitutional
limitations. Thus, the interpretation by the Whiley dissenters gives complete
effect to the intent of the framers in drafting (and the people in adopting)
article IV.
Each constitutional provision must be interpreted in light of the purpose
to be accomplished “and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or
remedied.”298 The court has repeatedly stated that its purpose is to fulfill,
never frustrate, the will of the people.299 A practical test of constitutional
interpretation is examining subsequent legislative determinations about the
meaning of a provision; if the text is subject to more than one interpretation,
the interpretation adopted by the legislature is given great deference by the
courts.300 The legislature has enacted numerous laws that require full
efficacy on a structured administrative chain of command in order to provide
for the direction and supervision of subordinates through the agency head.301
The agency head in turn is subject to the vested, inherent authority of the
297
Free Enterprise Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 502 (2010)
(relying on THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison) and highlighting presidential control
over appointees as a foundational principle from the beginning of the U.S. Constitution).
298
State ex rel. West v. Gray, 74 So. 2d 114, 115 (Fla. 1954).
299
Id.; Browning v. Fla. Hometown Democracy, Inc., 29 So. 3d 1053, 1063 (Fla. 2010);
Benjamin v. Tandem Healthcare, Inc., 998 So. 2d 566, 570 (Fla. 2008); Plante v. Smathers,
372 So. 2d 933, 936 (Fla. 1979); In re Advisory Op. to Governor Request, 374 So. 2d 959,
964 (Fla. 1979).
300
Agency for Health Care Admin. v. Associated Indus. of Fla., Inc., 678 So. 2d 1239,
1247 (Fla. 1996) (quoting Greater Loretta Improvement Ass’n v. State ex rel. Boone, 234 So.
2d 665, 669 (Fla.1970)).
301
For example, the general duties of all agency heads are outlined in FLA. STAT. § 20.05
(2018). The Department of Business and Professional Regulation and its several divisions
are placed under a secretary appointed by and serving at the pleasure of the governor. FLA.
STAT. § 20.165(1) (2018). One of these units is the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and
Tobacco, administered by a subordinate official, the Division Director, and expressly
authorized to appoint and train division personnel. FLA. STAT. § 561.11 (2018).
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governor to supervise administrative agencies. For example, when creating
the Agency for Health Care Administration, the legislature placed the agency
in a particular department but excluded that departmental secretary from any
control over the agency.302 Although the enabling statute required the
agency director to report to the governor, the statute otherwise was silent as
to the governor’s role.303 The court found the legislature intended the agency
to answer to the governor because the agency head was made an at-will
gubernatorial appointee.304 Similarly, the Agency for Persons with
Disabilities is housed administratively in the Department of Children and
Family Services, but is not subject to the direction, supervision, or control of
any function by that department.305 Rather, the director of the Agency for
Persons with Disabilities serves as the agency head for all purposes.306 The
First District Court of Appeal found no constitutional infirmity with this
structure.307 The legislature understands that executive power requires a
chain of command, which subjects subordinates to the direction and control
of more senior personnel concerning agency rulemaking. This principle is
even applicable to regulatory boards, where members are appointed for
specific terms and cannot be removed except for cause.308
The following examples show how the legislature uses express
statutory language to recognize the governor’s authority to supervise and
direct those agencies headed by appointees serving at the governor’s
pleasure.
To “promote accountability, integrity, and efficiency in
government . . . .” the legislature established an Office of Inspector General
in each agency.309 For agencies under the jurisdiction of the cabinet or
governor and cabinet, that agency head is authorized to appoint or remove
the agency inspector general.310 Specifically, “(f)or state agencies under the
jurisdiction of the Governor,” the chief inspector general, who is appointed
by and serving at the pleasure of the governor, appoints or removes agency
inspector generals.311 Because the statute provides no additional language
302

FLA. STAT. § 20.42 (1992).
Agency for Health Care Admin., 678 So. 2d at 1247 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 20.42
(1991)).
304
Id. at 1248 (AHCA later was restructured as a separate department); see FLA. STAT. §
20.42(2) (2018) (showing the Secretary still is appointed by the Governor, confirmed by the
Senate, and serves at the Governor’s pleasure).
305
FLA. STAT. § 20.197 (2018).
306
Id. at § 20.197(1).
307
J.M. v. Fla. Agency for Persons with Disabilities, 938 So. 2d 535, 538 n. 4 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2006).
308
FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 6(b).
309
FLA. STAT. § 20.055(2) (2018).
310
Id. at § 20.055(3)(a)1, (3)(c).
311
FLA. STAT. § 14.32(1) (2018); id. at § 20.055(3) (emphasis added); FLA. STAT. §
20.055(3)(a)1, (3)(c) (2018).
303
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“authorizing” the governor to “direct agencies,” the quoted clause is a
legislative acknowledgement of the governor’s existing authority over
agencies headed by at-will gubernatorial appointees. In turn, the statute
creating and authorizing the chief inspector general refers to “agencies under
the jurisdiction of the Governor.”312 The text and context of both statutes
are not limited merely to the EOG or a department where the legislature
expressly designates the governor as the agency head. Instead, the statutes
clearly convey the legislative understanding that the governor has directory
and supervisory authority over a number of agencies premised on the
constitutionally vested executive power.
The legislature also uses express statutory language when insulating
appointed officials from the governor’s direction and supervision. One
example is the Division of Administrative Hearings (“DOAH”), created to
conduct evidentiary hearings under the APA.313 Housed in the Department
of Management Services314 for administrative purposes, DOAH is not
“subject to the control, supervision, or direction by the Department of
Management Services in any manner . . . .”315 The same statute designates
the director of DOAH as its agency head and requires, upon Senate
confirmation, the director’s appointment by the Administration
Commission.316 This places the director outside the authority of the
department secretary and the governor.
As shown by these examples, since 1969, shortly after article IV,
section 6, was adopted as part of the 1968 Florida Constitution, the
legislature repeatedly determined that the interaction of sections 1(a) and 6
empowered the governor to direct and supervise at-will appointed executive
branch officials absent valid, express language in the Constitution or statute
providing otherwise. The Whiley majority interpreted a lack of express
authorization in the APA as a lack of authority in the governor.317 As shown
by reading all of article IV in pari materia, and by the foregoing statute
examples, the opposite is the case. In instances where the legislature may
act to limit the scope of the governor’s administrative authority but does not
do so, the governor retains the authority to direct and supervise at-will
appointees. The dissenters in Whiley, not the majority, correctly articulated
312

FLA. STAT. § 14.32(1) (2018) (emphasis added).
See FLA. STAT. §§ 120.56(1)(c), 120.569(2)(a), 120.65(1) (2018). See also Patricia A.
Dore, Access to Florida Administrative Proceedings, 13 FLA. STATE U. L. REV. 965, 1017
(1986).
314
FLA. STAT. § 20.22(1) (2018) (stating that the head of the Department of Management
Services is appointed by and serves at the pleasure of the Governor).
315
FLA. STAT. § 120.65(1) (2018).
316
FLA. STAT. § 14.202 (2018) (stating that the Administration Commission is comprised
of the governor and cabinet, with the governor as chair of the commission).
317
Whiley v. Scott, 79 So. 3d 702, 715 (Fla. 2011).
313
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the same understanding of the constitutional provisions defined by the
legislature, which is consistent with the interpretation and application of the
executive power since the founding of the State.318 As a result, the majority
opinion strayed from an interpretation that has been articulated and applied
for decades.
VI. CONSEQUENCES OF THE WHILEY DECISION
The Whiley majority rendered their decision by granting the petition for
writ of quo warranto but withheld issuing the writ, noting:
We trust that any provision in Executive Order 11–72 suspending
agency compliance with the APA, i.e., rulemaking, will not be
enforced against an agency at this time, and until such time as the
Florida Legislature may amend the APA or otherwise delegate
such rulemaking authority to the Executive Office of the
Governor.319
Fairly construing the majority’s adjuration with the plain text of EO 1172, there was arguably no need for further action because the executive order
did not suspend compliance with the APA. Although the court in prior cases
followed a similar pattern of granting the petition, issuing an opinion, and
withholding the writ, the effect of this decision appears to be as an advisory
opinion since it does not provide an actual remedy.320 Justice Polston
asserted as much in his dissent.321 Nevertheless, the governor acquiesced to
the majority by replacing EO 11-72 with Executive Order 11-211 (“EO 11211”).322 EO 11-211 required each agency headed by a gubernatorial
appointee to submit rulemaking documentation to OFARR for review at least
one week prior to submitting the documents for publication.323 The
precatory findings of that order strongly disagreed with the majority opinion
and its interpretation of the governor’s constitutionally-derived powers, but
then concluded “the majority opinion in Whiley is to be afforded the
deference due a judgment of the [Florida] Supreme Court.”324 This final
observation is questionable because, there was no writ, mandate, nor
“judgment” that was issued.325 Thus, the court left unclear as a matter of law
whether the case was decided conclusively.
318

Id. at 717–18, 723–26.
Id. at 717.
320
See Florida House of Representatives v. Crist, 999 So. 2d 601, 616 (Fla. 2008).
321
Whiley, 79 So. 3d at 726 (Polston, J., dissenting).
322
Fla. Exec. Order No. 2011-21, supra note 328, at 1.
323
Id. at 7, § 2.
324
Id. at 5.
325
See Case Docket for SC11-592 at http://onlinedocketssc.flcourts.org/DocketResults/
CaseDocket?Searchtype=Case+Number&CaseYear=2011&CaseNumber=592 (last visited
Nov. 27, 2018). The docket shows only a “disposition-granted” dated Aug. 16, 2011.
319

MILLER (DO NOT DELETE)

48

SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL

1/16/2019 11:09 AM

[Vol. 43:1

The Florida Legislature accepted the Supreme Court’s invitation to
amend the APA. Here, the legislature found that the governor’s position in
the case was consistent with the historical understanding and context,
judicial precedent, and legislative application.326 As a result, the legislature
amended both Florida Statutes, Chapter 20, and the APA, expressly
conforming the law with the proper interpretation of applicable
constitutional texts, and ensuring the governor’s continuing authority to
direct and supervise appointed agency heads serving at the governor’s
pleasure.
A. Executive Order 11-211
EO 11-211 superseded EO 11-72 but continued the governor’s
delegation of oversight and review functions to OFARR. Agencies headed
by at-will gubernatorial appointees were required to provide OFARR with
the text of all proposed new or amended rules, repeals, and all notices for
publication.327 However, the agencies were no longer required to obtain
OFARR approval to proceed with the APA rulemaking process.328 The order
initially set out the governor’s predicate findings; in particular, the
distinction between the governor, as elected by and answerable to the people
of the state, and the subordinate appointees who are not so accountable.329
Notably, EO 11-211 specifically and vigorously disputed the findings and
rationale of the Whiley majority opinion by restating the interpretation of the
governor’s powers and duties vested under article IV.330 The order also
acknowledged approval for the analysis and conclusions of the dissenting
justices in the Whiley decision.331 However, despite the court failing to issue
a writ or other remedy, EO 11-211 concluded by treating the majority
opinion as a valid judgment.332
B. The Inefficacy of Proceeding in Quo Warranto
Treating the majority opinion as a valid judgment is debatable. A
petition for writ of quo warranto is an original proceeding testing a person’s
right to hold an office or exercise some right or privilege.333 The Florida
Supreme Court has discretionary authority to issue the writ but its

326

2012 Fla. Laws 116, §1.
Fla. Exec. Order No. 2011-211, supra note 328, at 7, § 2.
328
See id. at 5–7, §§ 1, 2.
329
Id. at 7, § 2.
330
Id. at 4–5.
331
Id.
332
Id. at 5.
333
Tracy Raffles Gunn, Original Proceedings in Florida’s Appellate Courts, 32 STETSON
L. REV. 347, 354 (2003).
327
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jurisdiction is limited to state officers or state agencies.334 Typically,
exercising such a remedy as to subordinate state officers creates no
enforcement problems; the executive power and the duty of the governor to
ensure the faithful execution of the laws afford ample authority to carry out
the court’s writ. However, more significant constitutional issues arise when
the court issues a writ in circumstances that command the governor to cease
actions for which the court concludes there is no authority.
What if the governor politely declines to accede to the writ’s
prohibition? The Supreme Court arguably could not impose punishment for
contempt when the governor acts in his or her official capacity. To do so
would imply some superiority of the judicial branch over the executive, a
presumption prohibited by the Florida Constitution. The court lacks
authority to remove the duly-elected governor from office, even
temporarily.335 Thus, issuing the writ to a governor who adamantly opposes
the court’s authority risks the appearance of interfering with the legitimate
operation of the executive branch. Moreover, it would present problems of
justiciability and would confirm the court’s inability to enforce its own
orders. In an earlier opinion dismissing a petition for writ of mandamus to
compel the governor to issue a certificate of election for a congressional seat,
Chief Justice Edwin M. Randall explained:
The proposition . . . is that the Judicial Department of the
government may control the Executive in reference to an
executive duty . . . . It has ever been considered by statesmen and
jurists that where one has a power over another, in a public
capacity, the one is the greater and the other the inferior
power . . . . To employ the power of the courts in the business of
managing the office of the Governor and directing him in the
exercise of his duties, is to blot out the character given (that office)
in the Constitution of ‘Supreme Executive’ and ‘Chief Magistrate’
of the State, and reduce him to the level of a secretary or county
clerk . . . . If we have a case in which we cannot punish the
disobedient, it results that we have no power to command . . . we
produce no result except the exposure of our own impotence.336
Issuing an extraordinary writ to the governor presents different issues
than imposing such a remedy on subordinate officers. Recognizing this
discrepancy, the court has a history of granting such petitions and rendering
such opinions.337 But, the court traditionally withholds the issuance of a writ
to the governor by relying on the governor’s willingness to accede to the
334

FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(8).
See FLA. CONST. art. III, § 17; FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 3; FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3.
336
State ex rel. Bisbee v. Drew, 17 Fla. 67–73 (1879).
337
See Fla. House of Representatives v. Crist, 999 So. 2d 601, 616 (Fla. 2008); Ex parte
Henderson, 6 Fla. 279, 299 (Fla. 1855) (withholding issuing a writ of mandamus).
335
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holding.338
The Whiley majority closed their opinion with “it is so ordered,” but it
is difficult to understand the legal and precedential value of such a statement.
While Florida has a full history and analysis of the use of extraordinary writs,
particularly quo warranto, there are unanswered questions about the future
impact of this case. The court’s jurisdiction is discretionary as to issuing
writs of quo warranto; however, it is dubious whether such discretion
extends to granting petitions and declaring an opinion without entering a
final writ. If the old common law form of the writ provided the courts with
broad latitude in an original jurisdiction proceeding, that scope is restricted
by the jurisdictional limitations in the Florida Constitution. The original
scope of the judicial power may have included authority to approve requests
for extraordinary writs but withhold the actual issuance; however, by
articulating the scope of the Supreme Court’s quo warranto jurisdiction in
the Constitution, the people expressed their intent to constrain the court in
issuing both writs of mandamus and writs of quo warranto.339 Jurisdiction
does not go to the cause of action articulated in the petition; rather, it goes to
issuing the writ. If the court grants the petition, the court found proper
grounds to issue the writ and resolve the case. Arguably, if the court declines
to issue the writ, it can be inferred that the court did not find proper grounds
to issue one. In sum, the Constitution does not authorize the use of original
extraordinary writ jurisdiction to issue binding advisory judgments,
particularly when a full and complete legal remedy is available.340
Whiley had a full legal remedy available: an action for declaratory
judgment and injunctive relief in the circuit court.341 While declaratory
judgment and injunctive relief may lack the intellectual allure and relative
glamour of proceeding under the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction, this
standard form of action would have benefitted the court’s analysis and
holding. All factual disputes, including the actual impact of the governor’s
executive orders, would have been established in a complete record.
Additionally, if the judgment demonstrated a significant miscarriage of
constitutional authority and a need for prompt resolution, the District Court
of Appeal could certify the decision for immediate Supreme Court review.342
There would have been no need for the Supreme Court to ask whether the
case should be referred to the circuit court for fact finding; the record for
338

Crist, 999 So. 2d at 299; Ex parte Henderson, 6 Fla. at 299 (withholding issuing a writ
of mandamus).
339
FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(8) (1968).
340
State ex rel. Gibbs v. Bloodworth, 184 So. 1, 2 (Fla. 1938) (explaining the court will
not issue a writ in quo warranto where there is an ample and sufficient remedy at law.); see
also State ex rel. Landis v. Duval County, 141 So. 173, 176 (Fla. 1932).
341
FLA. STAT. § 86.011 (2011).
342
FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(4) (1968); FLA. R. APP. P. 9.030(a)(2)(B), 9.125.
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review would have been complete and the parties’ legal arguments would
have matured.343 Above all, the court would have had the advantage of the
lower court’s consideration of all the issues and articulation of the dispositive
law.
It is doubtful that an opinion issued without a final writ or judgment has
a binding effect, since the court’s jurisdiction to render decisions about the
scope and extent of the governor’s constitutional powers is limited to
advisory opinions requested by the governor. If Whiley is interpreted as an
advisory opinion because the governor’s substantial participation somehow
constituted a “request,” or simply because the court withheld the writ and
any other remedy, the decision is not binding precedent.344
C. The Legislative Response to the Supreme Court’s Request for
Clarification
The Florida Legislature understood the Whiley holding to mean that the
governor had no inherent constitutional authority to direct and supervise
agency rulemaking outside of any express legislative delegation in the
APA.345 The decision meant that agency heads who the governor appointed
and those serving at his or her pleasure could exercise delegated rulemaking
authority independent from any accountability to the governor except for the
possibility of removal from office. The Whiley majority’s view about how
the statutes organized executive agencies and delegated rulemaking
authority was one that misinterpreted the legislature’s intent.346 The
legislature adopted Florida Statutes, Chapter 20, to organize the functions of
the executive branch.347 The legislature adopted the APA to standardize the
proceedings necessary for administrative agencies to execute governmental
authority provided by statute.348 The various express delegations of
rulemaking authority in different statutes were made for agencies to
implement substantive law within the controlling structure established by
article IV of the Florida Constitution.349 Concerned about the implications
343
Scheduling Order, Whiley v. Scott, 79 So. 3d 702 (Fla. June 17, 2011) (No. SC 11592) (granting Petitioner’s Request for Expedited Oral Argument and scheduling oral
argument for July 29, 2011).
344
In re Advisory Op. to the Governor, 509 So. 2d 292, 301 (Fla. 1987).
345
2012 Fla. Laws 116, § 1(26).
346
FLA. STAT. § 120.54(5) (2018) (explaining the statute delegates authority to the
Administration Commission to adopt the rules of procedure applicable to proceedings under
the APA).
347
FLA. STAT. § 20.02 (2018).
348
FLA. STAT. §§ 120.54, 120.56, 120.565, 120.569 (2018).
349
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 455.2035 (2018) (authorizing the Department of Business and
Professional Regulation to adopt rules for licensure programs not placed under a statutory
regulatory board); FLA. STAT. § 570.07(23) (2018) (authorizing the Department of Agriculture
and Consumer Services to adopt rules implementing any of its statutory duties); FLA. STAT. §
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for ongoing, effective governmental administration if the Whiley holding
remained unabated, the legislature moved with alacrity to combat the
foreseeable chaotic effect of the decision.
The Whiley decision came at a time of greater legislative attention to
the implementation of delegated rulemaking authority, particularly the
economic impact of existing and proposed rules.350 Responding to Whiley,
similar bills were introduced in the House and Senate to clarify both agency
administrative authority and the legislature’s longstanding intent for the
constitutional executives, especially the governor, to direct and supervise atwill appointees in exercising delegated authority.351 Passed by both
chambers, the final bill was signed into law on April 13, 2012 as 2012 Florida
Laws 116.352
The legislature responded to the court’s invitation for clarification by
amending Florida Statutes, Chapters 20 and 120, expressly recognizing the
authority of elected executive branch officers, particularly the governor, to
direct and supervise those officials who they appoint and who serve at their
pleasure.353 The first eight sections of the law reiterated the legislative intent
624.308(1) (2018) (authorizing both the Department of Financial Services and the Financial
Services Commission to adopt rules implementing their respective statutes).
350
Miller, Direction and Supervision, supra note 17, at 351–354.
351
The bill, a committee substitute for House Bill 7055 (CS/HB 7055) also included
sections repealing unnecessary statutory delegations of rulemaking authority and establishing
a continuing process to provide annual recommendations to repeal unnecessary delegations.
The House bill, introduced by the House Rulemaking & Regulation Subcommittee, was
carried through its committee stops and presented on the floor by Rep. Matt Gaetz (R-Ft.
Walton Bch.). Senate Bill 1312 was introduced and sponsored principally by Sen. Don Gaetz
(R-Niceville); this bill eventually was tabled by the Senate in favor of the House bill. Effective
control of authority delegated by the legislature and a common-sense approach to government
management appears to be more than just a theoretical concept in Florida; it is a family affair.
Sen. Gaetz is the father of Rep. Gaetz, and the passage of CS/HB 7055 apparently is the first
instance of a bill being carried in the separate chambers of the Florida Legislature
simultaneously by sire and scion. See Press Release, Fla. Senate, State Agencies’ RuleMaking Process To Be Restrained, Governor Approves Gaetz-Gaetz Bill (Apr. 13, 2012),
https://www.flsenate.gov/Media/PressReleases/Show/1974; H.B. 7055, 2012 Leg. (Fla.
2012); S.B. 1312, 2012 Leg. (Fla. 2012) (last visited 12/2/2018).
352
2012 Fla. Laws 116.
353
FLA. STAT. §§ 20.02(3), 20.03(4), 20.03(5), 20.03(13), 20.05(1), 120.515, 120.52(3)
(2012); see also 2012 Fla. Laws 116, §§ 4–8. Sections 4–8 of the law enacted specific
amendments to Florida Statutes, Chapter 20, and the APA. Creating Florida Statutes,
§20.02(3), and amending §20.03(4), the new law expressly stated the administration of an
executive department placed under an officer or board appointed by and serving at the
pleasure of the governor remains at all times under the governor’s supervision and direction.
The law expressly defined the term “to serve at the pleasure” by creating new Florida Statutes,
§20.03(13), and reiterating that such an appointee “serving at the pleasure” remains subject
to the direction and supervision of the appointing authority. Florida Statutes, section 20.05(1),
was revised to expressly state that agency heads are subject to the constitutional allotment of
power in the executive branch. To avoid any further misapprehension, section 3 of the law
expressly stated the legislature’s intent in making the revisions to Chapter 20 and the APA
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apparent in the existing statutes, recognizing the capacity for rational and
pragmatic supervision of delegated rulemaking within the executive
branch.354 The legislature began by providing detailed findings that
explained the basis for the statutory amendments, and expressly affirmed that
both EO 11-72 and EO 11-211 were consistent with state law and public
policy.355
Twenty-six detailed findings clarified the legislature’s interpretation of
existing statutes as not granting at-will gubernatorial appointees any
autonomous authority.356 The legislature acknowledged the governor’s
constitutional role as the chief executive officer of the state, in light of the
historical understanding of executive power articulated by the framers of the
U.S. Constitution, and as each version of the Florida Constitution allocated
executive power.357 The legislature explained the foundation for the bill’s
clarification of statutory amendments, the relevant interpretation of the
constitutional assignment of executive power, and the implications for
statutory powers.358 The law confirmed the APA is only procedural in nature
and is not intended to intrude into the constitutional authority of elected
executive officers.359 The legislature clearly adopted a number of the
predicate paragraphs included in EO 11-211, which shows the congruence
of understanding between the legislative and executive branches in
opposition to the Whiley majority. The legislature expressly disagreed with
the majority’s rationale by approving the dissenting opinions.360 The
legislature emphasized the importance of holding appointed officials
accountable to elected officers and approved the interim results of the
governor’s OFARR review process.361 The legislative findings concluded
that the decision in Whiley is accorded the deference due to an advisory
opinion of the court because the court did not grant the requested relief.362

enumerated in the law: “The Legislature intends that the amendments made by this act to
[Florida Statutes, §§20.02, 20.03, and 20.05], which apply to the organizational structure of
the executive branch, and the creation of [Florida Statutes, 120.515], which applies to
administrative procedure, are to clarify that the placement of an executive department under
the direct administration of an officer or board appointed by and serving at the pleasure of the
Governor does not implicitly limit or restrict the Governor’s prerogative, legal authority, and
constitutional responsibility to direct and supervise the execution of the law and the exercise
of lawful discretion.”
354
2012 Fla. Laws 116, §§ 1–8.
355
Id. at §§ 1, 2.
356
Id. at § 1.
357
Id. at §§ 1(1)–(4).
358
Id. at §§ 1(5)–(11), (13)–(15), (17), (20)–(23).
359
Id. at § 1(16).
360
2012 Fla. Laws 116, § 1(12), (26)(b).
361
Id. at §§ 1(20)–(25).
362
Id. at § 1(26)(d).
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The legislature made two amendments to the APA: the first being a
specific declaration of policy in a new statute section, which confirms the
procedural nature of the APA and does not impair the authority of elected
officers to direct and supervise their at-will appointees.363 This section
addressed a significant issue argued in Whiley by expressly stating that an
agency head’s adherence to the direction and supervision of the appointing
officer is not a delegation or transfer of statutory authority.364 For example,
complying with the governor’s policy directions is not a transfer of the
rulemaking responsibilities exercisable by the agency head.
The second amendment emphasized the statutory definition of “agency
head,” reiterating the express language that the appointee remains subject to
the direction and supervision of the appointing authority but also confirming
that the actions of an agency head as authorized by statute are official acts.365
This latter clause prevents any argument that an otherwise-valid action is
voidable if done without the permission of the appointing authority. These
two amendments to the APA make clear that “direction and supervision”
constitute proper influence over an agency head’s exercise of statutory
authority.
Contrary to the Whiley majority, the legislature found no violation of
the constitutional separation of powers in EO 11-72.366 The Governor’s
letter to the Secretary of State transmitting the executed version of the act367
noted the concurrence of legislative and executive branch interpretations of
the governor’s article IV authority over at-will appointees.368 The letter also
concluded that the statutory revisions in the new law were unnecessary under
a correct interpretation of the Constitution.369 That may be true. But, what
is equally true is that the statutory amendments do not conflict with such an
interpretation, and the statutory clarifications clearly liberated the governor
from any force of the Whiley opinion.

363

FLA. STAT. § 120.515 (2012); see also id. at §§ 3, 4, 7.
FLA. STAT. § 120.515 (2012).
365
FLA. STAT. § 120.52(3) (2012).
366
CS/HB 7055 (2012), signed by the Governor and enacted as 2012 Fla. Laws 116, § 2,
showing that because EO 11-01 attempted to suspend certain publications by the secretary of
state, in possible contravention to FLA. STAT. § 120.55 (2010), the order was not endorsed by
the legislature. However, any legislative disapproval apparently dissipated when EO 11-72
superseded EO 11-01. Fla. Exec. Order No. 2011-72, § 8 (April 8, 2011).
367
Upon being approved and signed by the Governor, an act is deposited with the
Department of State. FLA. STAT. § 15.07 (2018). The department assigns the actual chapter
number to an act. FLA. STAT. § 15.155(1)(d) (2018).
368
Letter from Rick Scott, Governor of Florida, to Ken Detzner, Secretary of State (April
13, 2012), at 2, https://www.flgov.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/4.13.12-HB-7055Transmittal-Letter.pdf (last visited Dec. 19, 2018).
369
Id.
364
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VII. CONCLUSION
Since 1787, framers of constitutions (including the Florida
Constitution) allocated political power among the legislative, executive, and
judicial branches based on the principle that such delegations vested in
particular officers’ bodies the entirety of the power so referenced. The
Florida Constitution restrains governmental excess by dividing political
power into three branches, creating further internal divisions within each
branch, and expressly limiting the exercise of certain vested powers.370 The
framers of most constitutions presumed the powers vested in each branch
were not limited only to those expressly discussed in the constitutional text,
but encompassed authority logically necessary for the particular branch to
carry out its charge from the people. This implicitly entails all authority
distinctively associated with that branch. The Florida Constitution vests the
supreme executive power in the governor without detailing the principles,
doctrines, or limitations of that authority in addition to those expressly stated
elsewhere in the Constitution because the framers commonly understood the
scope and meaning of the terms employed. Thus, the governor’s vested
authority embraces the entire scope of executive power and function not
otherwise assigned to another officer or body.
The Whiley majority viewed rulemaking power as residing in the
legislature at all times, never implicating any aspect of constitutional power,
and always controlled exclusively by legislative action.371 Such an absolutist
interpretation is not warranted by the text of the Florida Constitution; if such
interpretation was the case, then arguably the legislature could not delegate
rulemaking to any executive branch official. The national history of
understanding, controlling, and applying constitutional executive power, in
addition to Florida case law, shows that the rulemaking power may be
delegated to the executive branch with specific limits and controls necessary
to execute the laws, rather than the unbridled making of public policy.372 The
operation of delegated rulemaking authority is within the governor’s
overarching constitutional responsibility to ensure the proper execution of
the laws. Unless expressly and clearly limited by the Constitution, the
governor retains full constitutional authority to direct and supervise the
370
See FLA. CONST. art. II, § 3, creates the basic separation of powers. FLA. CONST. art.
III, § 1 divides the legislature into two chambers, and § 8 provides the governor’s veto as a
check on the legislative power. FLA. CONST. art. IV, §§ 1 and 4 divide the executive power
between the Governor and three Cabinet members, § 6 provides limits on the Governor’s
power of appointment through Senate confirmation or Cabinet approval, and § 9 vests certain
executive functions for fish and wildlife conservation in a separate commission. FLA. CONST.
art. V, § 1, creates four separate levels of trial and appellate courts in Florida and constrains
their respective jurisdictions.
371
Whiley v. Scott, 79 So. 3d 702, 715–17 (Fla. 2011).
372
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §§ 120.52(8), 120.536(1) (2018).
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actions of subordinate officials, including delegated rulemaking.
All versions of the Florida Constitution consistently vested the
governor with the “supreme executive power” while contemporaneously
creating other executive officers independent from the governor’s control.
These independent officers are accountable only to the electorate. The use
of the word “supreme” creates a hierarchical structure for exercising the
executive power. Absent an express provision, the governor remains fully
authorized and responsible for directing and supervising the executive
branch’s functions implemented through administrative agencies.
By only narrowly focusing on certain language in article IV, section 6,
and not giving a full and complete reading to section 1(a), the Whiley
majority mistakenly decided the Governor could not direct his at-will
appointees because the legislature did not expressly allow him to do so. The
error in this conclusion is found in the question that logically should be
answered next: if not subject to the governor’s supervision, then to whom
are these unelected officials accountable? The Whiley majority, finding the
agency had autonomy, did not articulate the accountability of such agency
heads and thus failed to address the very real consequences of their decision.
The Florida Constitution does not authorize the creation of bureaucrats
who are autonomous of any supervision. The clear intent of the people is for
those ultimately responsible for the acts of the various branches of
government to be answerable directly to the electorate. This is so even if the
justices themselves periodically stand before the voters for merit retention.373
From this perspective, the requirements of article IV, section 6, are a
particular expression of the governor’s supremacy. Under section 6, apart
from elected constitutional officers and the members of certain licensing
boards, the administrative head of any executive department must serve at
the pleasure of the governor. The governor is ultimately responsible for
every executive act that is not the direct responsibility of another elected
constitutional officer.
Florida Statutes, section 20.02, states the legislature intended for the
structure of the executive branch to be consistent with the “executive
capacity to administer effectively at all levels.” Under long-standing
interpretations and applications of executive power vested in the governor,
the capacity to effectively administer all levels of the executive branch was
assured by the governor’s authority to direct and supervise at-will
gubernatorial appointees. Finding the governor cannot direct or supervise
at-will appointees in the development of administrative policy is not
consistent with the full language of the Constitution and section 20.02.
Contrary to this legislative intent, the Whiley majority lessened that capacity
373

FLA. CONST. art. V, § 10(a).
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for effective administration. If every appointed agency head may pursue
policy development and implementation without oversight from any elected
official, and the elected official’s only recourse to achieve consistent
implementation of preferred policies is to summarily dismiss agency heads,
then the potential for serial dismissals and disruptions of agency operations
likely would produce ineffective administration. In this respect, the
majority’s rationale authorizes the legislature to create agencies autonomous
from any executive control, which conflicts with the rationale and conclusion
in Jones v. Chiles.
The legislature enacts policy and authorizes entities to administer the
programs created, but this allocation cannot avoid the constitutional
determination that all executive action must be accountable to elected
officials under the Constitution. The execution of a statutory program must
operate within the constitutional allocation of executive powers. This does
not lessen the power of the legislature but represents the intent of all framers
of all variants of the Florida Constitution: the substantive power to execute
the laws enacted by the legislature is vested in the executive. The executive
branch has no substantive authority to create public policy. Likewise, the
legislative branch has no substantive authority to execute the laws but must
direct their administration to the coordinate branch.
The delegation of rulemaking authority is an efficacious tool designed
for the constrained implementation of law, but that delegation to an executive
branch department must comport with the balance struck in the Florida
Constitution. The Constitution places these agencies within the executive
branch. While expressly providing for control of the executive branch by
the governor exercising the supreme executive power, the Constitution only
supports, not creates, the legislature’s delegation of rulemaking authority.
Statutes that articulate the scope of authority and duties of the chief inspector
general demonstrate the legislature’s understanding and intent that certain
agencies are still subject to the governor’s constitutional authority, even if
the governor is not the denominated agency head. Although this
understanding is not expressly stated in every statute, the historical record
proves the generally-held assumption that the governor, as chief executive,
is responsible for and has authority over executive branch agencies unless
the Constitution or statute provides otherwise. The mere fact that the
administration of an executive department was placed directly under an
officer appointed by and serving at the pleasure of the governor did not
change the governor’s authority over that agency.
Whiley’s argument was inherently flawed. For example, she and her
supporting amici argued that a policy initially formulated by internal agency
considerations, before rulemaking even began, was somehow equal in status
to a statutorily-defined rule and thus merited the full panoply of APA process
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if the governor participated in the initial stages. By misusing the word
“rule,” Whiley set up an ephemeral straw man, and invited the court to find
some legislative policy dictating the manner in which the governor may
communicate with agency heads about formulating policy prior to taking
any action to establish that policy as a rule.374 One amicus illogically argued
that “(p)reventing agencies from even initiating rule development cuts the
public out of an important step in shaping the language of the proposed
rule.”375 The APA requires rule development before new rulemaking and
requires rulemaking before there is an enforceable rule.376 As the APA sets
no time limit for initiating rule development, save certain requirements under
Florida Statutes, section 120.54(1)(b), there is no timeline for internal policy
formulation. For the sake of argument, if the governor effectively shut down
all rulemaking by prohibiting rule development, there would be no rule
meriting public input. Only if agencies were ordered to violate the law and
not provide any entry point for public comment would there be a detriment
to the public interest. In such a case, judicial intervention through injunctive
or other relief is available. Hyperbole is not a substitute for cogent analysis.
This shows the sophistry of the majority opinion. If the majority truly
believed that agency heads were not subject to the governor’s direction and
supervision concerning rulemaking, they should have denied the petition.
No violation of the APA was shown and Whiley’s full and proper remedy, if
any, was against those agency heads purportedly failing to exercise their
exclusive rulemaking power. Her counsel never stated how the governor
could enforce either executive order and thereby violate the APA. Whiley
clearly had sufficient available legal remedies other than seeking an
extraordinary writ from the Supreme Court; these included bringing actions
against the actual agency heads, whom she argued had the sole legal power
to direct agency rulemaking.377 Whiley repeatedly stressed that the
legislature stated the requirements for rulemaking in the APA and that only
the statutory process controlled.378 The Governor agreed because, in reality,
that point was never at issue. In adopting the time requirements for
compliance with the rulemaking procedures, the legislature provided neither
direction for the internal processes exercised by the executive branch nor
structure for the development of options subject to the discretion of an
agency head. In the end, there is no alternative to complying with the APA
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A real straw man at least is tangible to the point of requiring actual straw.
Brief for Florida Audubon Society as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note
105, at 14.
376
FLA. STAT. § 120.54 (2018).
377
See discussion of possible actions, supra note 83.
378
See Petition for Writ of Quo Warranto, supra note 4, at 12, 14–18, 21–24, 30;
Petitioner’s Amended Reply, supra note 102, at 13, 15, 17–19.
375
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assurances of notice and an opportunity to be heard after the statutory
rulemaking process is initiated.379 Indeed, Whiley’s counsel failed to point
to any factual, legitimate, or actually threatened breach of the APA in the
governor’s orders.380 The moot point of prohibiting statutorily required
publication by the Department of State was never more than a minor part of
Whiley’s argument. Her true complaint was a policy disagreement with the
governor.
Regardless of the arguments, the court was responsible for the decision.
Treating the phrase “supreme executive power” in section 1(a) as a merely
textual embellishment, the majority took an absolutist view that
implementing a legislatively delegated power excluded any role for
constitutionally vested, supervisory executive power. In doing so, the
majority confined itself to a neatly circumscribed but flawed analysis. So
constrained, the majority endorsed the conclusions in AGO 81-49 as fully
consistent with their reasoning, overlooking the failure of that earlier
discussion to construe together all relevant clauses of article IV to give each
their full meaning and fulfill the intent of the people in adopting the 1968
Constitution.
The majority’s analysis is significantly flawed because it fails to clarify
two consequences of their decision. The first is practical: if agency heads
appointed by and serving at the pleasure of the governor are independent
from gubernatorial direction and supervision in the exercise of agency
rulemaking authority, then to whom are they accountable? If the majority
meant to recognize a “fourth branch of government” composed of unelected
bureaucrats, there is little support for this proposition in the Constitution’s
text. The Constitution’s language shows the people intended for those
379

See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §§ 120.50, 120.52(8)(a), 120.54(1), 120.56, 120.74 (2018). One
concludes the Florida Legislature is far more concerned with the function of implementing
and executing the statutes over the form of internal executive branch decision making.
380
Oral Argument at 1:08:48, Whiley v. Scott, 79 So. 3d 702 (Fla. 2011) (No. SC 11592), http://wfsu.org/gavel2gavel/viewcase.php?eid=212. Justice Peggy Ann Quince clearly
asked “[w]hat is the additional step?” and Whiley’s counsel could only respond with
speculation that OFARR could stop rulemaking initiated by citizen petition. This argument
showed a fundamental misunderstanding of both the APA and the governor’s orders. The
APA gives anyone with the requisite interest the right to request an agency to begin
formulating policy implementing statute by initiating the formal rulemaking process. See FLA.
STAT. § 120.54(7) (2018). The law requires the agency to make one of three final decisions
on that petition within 30 days. The agency’s decision does not meet the statutory definition
of a rule because it is not a statement of general applicability. See FLA. STAT. § 120.52(16).
Therefore, the decision whether to grant a petition to initiate rulemaking was not a matter for
review by OFARR under EO 11-01 or its replacement, 11-72. However, because the decision
to grant or deny a petition to initiate rulemaking affects the requesting party’s substantive
interests, the APA authorized a challenge to the agency’s decision with the full panoply of
procedural process rights afforded in Florida Statutes, sections 120.569 and 120.57, including
judicial review of the resulting final order under Florida Statutes, section 120.68. Counsel’s
hypothetical was not only wrong but irrelevant.
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exercising governmental authority to be accountable to the electorate, either
directly or through their subordination to those directly-elected officials.
Since the majority interpreted article IV, section 6, as authorizing the
creation of independent appointed agency heads, a reading not previously
presumed by the other two branches, the holding also should have clarified
how the APA provided for holding these officials accountable.
The second consequence is the potential for administrative chaos. One
possible result of finding an independent “fourth branch of government” is
the immediate replacement of all appointed agency heads with every change
in governor. A new governor, having no assurances that the present agency
heads would feel bound to concur with or implement the new governor’s
preferred policies, should be expected to remove all agency heads
immediately upon taking office and replace them with the governor’s
preferred interim appointees until the Senate could act. This type of
upheaval every four to eight years would impede policy implementation
more than the internal executive review processes initiated by new
governors. Such uncertainty increases the risks of delay in addressing the
needs of those vulnerable populations ostensibly of concern to Whiley and
her peers.
Understanding the flaws in Whiley’s arguments or the lapses in analysis
applied by the majority does not answer the core question of why the
majority adopted their position in the face of the cogent and correct
arguments by the governor and dissenting opinions. Ascribing motives other
than seeking to interpret and apply the text of the Constitution is not
supported by the opinion or the court record and would be merely
speculative. Yet, the majority must have had some reason to exercise the
court’s unbridled discretion and entertain the petition in quo warranto.
Perhaps Justice Jackson’s concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer381 provides some insight:
The opinions of judges, no less than executives and publicists,
often suffer the infirmity of confusing the issue of a power’s
validity with the cause it is invoked to promote, of confounding
the permanent executive office with its temporary occupant. The
tendency is strong to emphasize transient results upon policies . . .
and lose sight of enduring consequences upon the balanced power
structure of our Republic.382
The majority opinion hinged on a presumption that “the power to
remove is not the power to control.”383 This conclusion conflicts with the
381
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring in result).
382
Id.
383
Whiley v. Scott, 79 So. 3d 702, 715 (Fla. 2011).
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understanding of executive power held by the nation’s founders, with the
application of that power by federal and state executive branch officers at the
time the Florida Constitution of 1838 was developed, and with basic human
nature. The majority’s conclusion could be read as frustrating the intent of
the people. By vesting the supreme executive power in the governor, the
people of Florida expressly intended a hierarchical exercise of the executive
power. If not expressly delegated by the Constitution, the authority and
responsibility to direct and supervise at-will appointees remains in the
governor so that no unelected subordinate exercises governmental power
without oversight by one who is ultimately held accountable by the
electorate.
The Whiley majority sought to address what appeared to be a human
problemwhich in actuality was mere hyperboleby applying a neatly
circumscribed constitutional analysiswhich excluded full and proper
interpretation of all the applicable textleading to a plausible conclusion,
that fails upon full and proper constitutional construction and reasonable
statutory interpretation. As argued by the Governor and expressly stated by
the legislature, the majority’s conclusion that the Governor lacked
constitutional authority to direct and supervise his appointees was wrong.

